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Abstract 
In the first chapter, I analyze the impact of changes in aggregate holding in special asset 
purchase programs by Federal Reserve Systems (FED) as an alternate monetary policy at 
aggregate level. Later, to complement the analysis of monetary impact at aggregate level, I also 
analyze the impact of monetary actions at bank stock level with a set of 186 banks. First, for the 
overall sample period, expected monetary shock has positive effect on bank stock return; 
however, unexpected shock component has otherwise negative impact. Second, during both 
conventional and QE regime, monetary shocks are not significant in explaining weekly stock 
returns; however change in FED’s total asset holding in special programs is significant during 
the QE regime and such findings are more robust for the “large” banks when compared to 
“medium” and “small” banks. 
The second chapter presents the second essay that is one of the early studies to analyze 
whether either the changes in accounting standard or the changes in prudential regulatory 
regimes may affect the bank earning management in terms of Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP) 
systematically. Results suggest that, in general, bank managers use LLP as a tool for earning 
management for income smoothing and also for capital management once LLP is allowed to be 
a part of Tier-I capital requirement. Both changes in prudential regulation from pro-cyclic to a 
dynamic regime and convergence of accounting standard from rule-based to principle-based 
standards have significant negative fixed effects separately and jointly once included.  
 
JEL Classification : G01, E42, E44, E52, E58 
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1. Chapter 01: Monetary Policy Tools, Monetary Shocks and Bank Stock 
Returns: Evidence From 2008 Quantitative Easing In United States 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Whether monetary policy has significant impact on financial markets is a long-debated 
open question in financial economics literature. While monetarists argue that monetary policy 
may actively affect aggregate demand, its ineffectiveness during the “liquidity trap” is also well 
documented. Besides, the nature of effective monetary involvement during a zero-bound regime 
is not vividly explained (see: Thorbecke (1997) among others). 
The recent global financial crisis of 2007 preceded by the Lehman Brothers failure once 
again rejuvenates this debate on effectiveness of monetary policy. Following the 2007 financial 
debacle, the Federal Reserve (hereafter FED) introduces a set of conventional and non-
conventional monetary policy tools to keep the economy vibrant. As conventional monetary 
tools become virtually ineffectual with Federal Fund Rates reaching the zero-bound threshold, 
the FED pursues Quantitative Easing (hereafter QE) monetary regime; QE policy entails 
purchasing different classes of assets from the financial market with the intent to impart 
additional liquidity and to affect the interest rate term structure by influencing markets 
expectations on future interest rates. FEDs decision to open asset purchase windows mark as 
the transition of Fed policies from conventional regime to the unconventional QE regime (Al-
Mamun et. al (2010)1). 
Although the recent research interest in QE is overly motivated by the extra-ordinary 
monetary policy responses by the developed economies, like: United State, United Kingdom, 
and European Union member countries during the global financial crisis, the QE as a monetary 
policy phenomenon has a relatively old history going back to the monetary regime of the 
United States of America during the great depressions of the 1930s. A more recent experience 
is the Japanese QE regime policy that is more frequently cited in the monetary easing 
literature; accordingly, extant literature on QE overly focuses on the interaction between 
monetary fundamentals and macroeconomic stability during QE in Japan. Only a select few 
studies, however, analyze the reaction of financial markets. Recently a few studies analyze the 
recent monetary easing in United Kingdom focusing on the impacts on conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy on interest rate, financial markets, and expected inflation (see: 
Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong (2010)). 
Bernanke (2004) draws the critical comparisons from Japanese QE and provides a 
theoretical framework about how a monetary authority may still influence money supply even 
under a zero-bound interest regime; Bernanke (2004) suggests two specific ways: a) by 
managing its balance sheet components, specifically, through re-organizing the type of assets, 
and b) re-stating its commitment to keep interest rates low over longer time horizons. 
However, few empiric studies analyze the validity of Bernanke (2004) argument in the context 
of recent 2007 financial crisis and the following 2008 QE regime. More recently, Shiratsuka 
(2010) finds out that the Bank of Japan’s monetary easing policy and the FED’s QE policy are 
fundamentally different as the FED’s policy entails managing asset side components compared 
to Bank of Japan’s approach of managing central bank liability components. So, a logical 
conclusion from Japanese QE studies is that any inference of Japanese evidence may approached 
                                                          
1 Discussion of FEDs policy action during 2008 financial crisis and a detailed time line is available at; 
FED Systems webpage: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf . 
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with some caution as the FED’s monetary easing is qualitatively different from that of the Bank 
of Japan. 
Given the present statute of monetary economics and finance literature, this paper is 
motivated to analyze FEDs QE policy responses in the context of the United States of America 
with three specific motivations. First, although Bernanke (2004) discusses a set of alternative 
monetary policy tools under QE, a few studies provide empiric evidence on the issue in US 
context. This study is one of the early studies to analyze the impact of FEDs total asset 
holdings under special programs over the other monetary policy tools, market indexes and 
other target variables; like: bond spreads, and SWAP and commercial paper interest rates. 
Second, we use the definition of expected shocks and unexpected shocks as provided by 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). This paper is one of the early studies to analyze whether these 
monetary policy shocks are different during QE regime and pre-QE regime, and whether the 
relationship between expected and unexpected shocks with other monetary policy tools, market 
indexes and other target variables are similar. Accordingly, we also contribute to the monetary 
transmission channel literature. 
Third, to complement our analysis of FEDs monetary actions at aggregate level, we 
also analyze impact of FED’s Asset holding on bank stock prices in addition to our analysis of 
aggregate level. We extend from Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) framework of analyzing stock 
price reaction to expected and unexpected monetary shocks and include change FED’s total 
asset holding as proxy for FED’s asset side management and interact with a set of dummies for 
asset purchase program initiation and closing events.  
We use a combination of daily and weekly data from December 18, 2002 to November 
30, 2011 period and divide the total sample into three possible samples: a) the Overall period 
(December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011), b) the Pre Quantitative Easing (QE) Period 
(December 18, 2002 to December 24, 2008), and c) the QE Period (December 31, 2008 to 
November 30, 2011). Summary statistics of conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
tools and monetary shocks support the argument of regime change in these variables during 
pre-QE and QE regime. In the first stage of empiric analysis, we use VAR setup to analyze the 
inter-relationship between the monetary policy tools and the aggregate target variables. 
Results suggest that, during the QE regime, only asset-side monetary policy tool, i.e. 
changes in Federal Reserve’s total asset holding under special programs, has impact on market 
indexes and other target variables. Evidence are also consistent with the hypothesis that, as 
federal fund rates approaches the zero-bound threshold, federal fund rate loses its effectiveness 
as monetary policy tool. As federal fund rates approaches zero-bound, monetary shocks, both 
expected and unexpected components, become rather less efficient tool in transmitting 
monetary policy information to the target variables during the QE regime. 
Later, in the second stage, we use a panel regression set up to analyze impact of FED’s 
total asset holding on the bank stocks by using an extension of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
empiric specification. We use a sample of 186 banks that disclose financial information on the 
COMPUSTAT Bank Annual and have stock return on the CRSP database. We control for 
bank size effect by ranking the bank sample into three classes: small, medium and large for 
lowest 33% rank, middle 34% and highest 33% ranks respectively. 
As such, this study may contribute to extant literatures on financial markets and 
monetary transmission in third distinct ways. First, empirical evidence from this study may 
enhance better understanding about how FED's asset side management can complement 
conventional monetary policy actions during monetary easing regime; that is directly related to 
the set of QE literatures. Second, the analysis of monetary policy shocks and their sensitivity 
contributes to the other trend of monetary policy literature that focuses on transmission 
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channels of monetary impact and their impact on financial markets. Third, we provide analysis 
at both aggregate level and firm level as we investigate the QE impact over the bank stocks. 
Remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section two provides a brief 
discussion on relevant literature. The next section discusses the data and methodology, 
followed by a brief description on descriptive statistics in section four. Later, the section five 
and section six summarize the pair-wise Granger causality and VAR estimations respectively. 
Section seven presents the bank stock level analysis, and section seven concludes with a brief 
discussion on the key findings. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
1.2.1 Quantitative Easing Literature 
The first evidence of Quantitative Easing cited in literature is the monetary response of 
the United States as the Federal Reserve System begins with $ 1 billion purchase of the 
Government treasuries in 1932 and maintains till 1936. However, monetary impact during 
Quantitative Easing (QE) regime is a rather less-frequently researched issue and still debated, 
and unlike the conventional monetary literature, literature on QE is rather scanty. 
Existing literature overly focuses on the empiric evidences on mostly Japanese 
experience during 1990’s following the later 1980’s market crash. As Japanese official bank rate 
effectively reached the zero-bound in February 1999, the Bank of Japan initiates Quantitative 
Easing as a supplement to zero-rate policy in March 2001 to provide further stimulus to the 
economy and to avoid deflationary trend. Shirakawa (2002) provides a lucid discussion on the 
Japanese experience of QE. Shirakawa (2002) delineates possible transmission channels of 
monetary policy during a zero-bound interest regime and argues that Japanese approach to QE 
during 2000 is essentially similar to the early 1930’s experience in Sweden and US of 
Quantitative Easing. 
Earlier QE studies provide analytical and theoretical reasoning on whether the FEDs 
policy may still be affective under zero-bound interest regime (see: Gauti and Woodford (2004), 
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), and Bernanke (2004), among others). Gauti and Woodford 
(2004) analyze the plausible impact of Quantitative easing as a supplement to zero interest rate 
in a Neo- Keynesian framework and argue that QE may fail to inject desired level of stimulus to 
an economy if central bank policy cannot change expectations about future policy conduct. 
However, Gauti and Woodford (2004) interpretation is different from Auerbach and Obstfeld 
(2003) based on similar framework as the latter assume that open-market operation may 
permanently increase the monetary base. 
Bernanke (2004) draws reference form Japanese experience and discusses three 
monetary policy alternatives during a zero-interest regime that can provide additional stimulus 
to an economy. First, central bank can provide assurance that short rates will be kept lower in 
future as they expect. Second, monetary authority may change relative supply through open 
market operations. Thirdly, by increasing its balance sheet, central bank may keep the short 
rates at the zero-bound. Bernanke also argues that credibility of monetary policy will be pivotal 
in such policy regimes. 
More recently, Klyuev et al (2009) discuss on four possible monetary alternative actions 
by central banks during a Quantitative Easing regime by: a) making explicit commitment to 
maintain low policy rates, b) providing additional liquidity to the financial institutions, c) 
affecting the long-term interest rates by purchasing government securities and d) actively 
intervening specific credit markets. However, the impact of central bank actions may not be 
obvious because monetary transmission to the economy is complex. 
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In a recent study, Shiratsuka (2010) compares the QE policy of the Bank of Japan during 
2001 to 2006 and QE policy initiated by United States Federal Reserve. Shiratsuka (2010) 
concludes that, unlike Bank of Japan’s approach of managing liability-side of the balance-sheet, 
US Fed engages in an asset-side management approach. So, the eventual monetary impact may 
not be necessarily similar. 
 
1.2.2 Expected and Unexpected Monetary Shocks  
Kuttner (2001) and Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) use the difference between the 
change in current month or one month ahead futures contract rate on the day of the 
announcement of monetary policy stance as a definition of policy surprise. One underlying 
assumption is that over a small interval, in their case one day over which they calculate the 
surprise, the risk premiums do not change. Later, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) argue that 
using daily data in calculating policy surprise may lead to sample selection problem. Bernanke 
and Kuttner (2005) provide an alternate solution by calculating policy surprise at monthly 
horizons, as given in equation (1) and (2). Here, expected component of shock is the anticipated 
shock measures in terms of difference between previous period Federal Fund futures and 
Federal Reserve’s target fund rate. Unexpected component is the difference between weighted 
average of target fund rates and the anticipated previous period federal fund futures (see: 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for more). 
Unexpected Monetary Shock  (1) 
Expected Monetary Shock 
 
(2) 
Here, expected component of shock is the anticipated shock measures in terms of 
difference between previous period Federal Fund futures and Federal Reserve’s target fund 
rate. Unexpected component is the difference between weighted average of target fund rates 
and the anticipated previous period federal fund futures. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
document that stocks are only unexpected shocks have explanatory powers, not the expected 
shocks. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Data 
Federal Reserve St. Louis Database provides Federal Reserve Systems balance sheet 
weekly data from 18-Dec-02 to 13-Jul-11 measured at weekly averages and Wednesday levels. 
Accordingly, we choose a common sample period of December 18, 2002 to July 13, 2011 and 
divide the overall sample period into two sub-samples: a) Pre Quantitative Easing (QE) Period 
(December 18, 2002 to December 24, 2008), and b) QE Period (December 31, 2008 to 
November 30, 2011). We consider four conventional monetary policy tools: DFF as Federal 
Fund Rate (in %) , TOT as total holding (in billion dollars) in special asset purchase programs 
by Federal Reserve System, M1 as Narrow Money (in billion dollars) and, nonM1 as 
components of M2 not included in M1 (in billion dollars). All monetary policy data are weekly 
frequency. 
To analyze the impact of QE policies at aggregate level, we use three bond-spreads and 
four market indices. Three bond-spread returns are AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread (in %), 
BBB as BBB option-adjusted spread (in %), and CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread (in %). 
Four Market Indices are DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, TWEXM as 
change in major trade-weighted exchange index, SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index, and VIX 
as Implied Volatility Index on S&P500. Besides, to analyze the impact of monetary shocks on 
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interest rates, we collect interest rate data on swaps and commercial papers (both financial and 
non-financials) of different maturities. All market index, bond spreads, swap and commercial 
paper interest rates are daily. Table 01 reports the descriptive statistics of the aggregate level 
variables. To analyze the impact of QE at bank stock level, we use a sample of 186 banks that 
report balance sheet information in the COMPUSTAT Bank Annual database and collect their 
stock return data from CRSP; later Table 08 reports bank summary statistics. 
 
1.3.2 Variable Descriptions 
Existing literature, generally, cites Federal fund rate and money supply measures; like: 
Narrow money or M1, Broad Money or M2, and others; like: M3, M4 and their components as 
conventional monetary policy tools. From Federal Reserve System balance sheet perspective, 
money supply components are essentially liability side components. Among the conventional 
monetary policy tools, federal fund rate is often cited as more effective measure compared to 
money supply measures. However, effectiveness of federal fund rate is limited by the zero-
bound thresholds. Once fund rate approaches zero bound thresholds, deviations in fund rate 
become relatively insignificant in explaining its target variables, generally, interest rates and 
financial markets. 
 Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) is one the recent studies to use unconventional monetary 
policy tools terminology explicitly for Federal Reserves’ asset purchase programs. As federal 
fund rate approaches zero bound, Bernanke (2004) argues that asset-side components of 
Federal Reserve System may evolve to be more efficient in influencing the target variables. 
Although repurchase and reverse-repurchase agreements are two most import elements, Fed’s 
asset side comprises with a wide variety of components. However, as this study focuses on the 
analysis of monetary policy impact on market indexes, bond spreads and other indexes, we use 
total asset holding under special asset purchase programs by the Federal Reserves’ as the proxy 
for unconventional monetary policy tool.  
 
1.3.3 Calculation of Monetary Shocks 
Following Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we calculate the expected and unexpected 
monetary shocks as given in equation (1) and (2). Table 02 reports the descriptive statistics of 
the calculated expected and unexpected monetary shocks for the three sample periods: a) 
overall period, b) pre-QE period, and c) QE period. 
Unexpected Monetary Shock 
 
(1) 
Expected Monetary Shock  (2) 
 
1.3.4 Monetary transmission under Quantitative Regimes: Testable Hypothesis 
Bernanke (2004) argues that, under a zero-bound interest rate regime, monetary 
authority may still impart desired monetary impacts through managing the asset-side 
components. Kuttner (2001) and Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004), and later, Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), provide alternate ways to measure monetary policy surprise that may work as 
transmission channel through which monetary policy impacts can be transmitted to the target 
variables. In line with these two sets of literature, this study is motivated at analyzing a few 
questions related with Quantitative Easing. Are expected and unexpected monetary shocks 
different during the Quantitative Easing regime? Is there any evidence of regime change 
during QE regime? What are the relationships between monetary shocks and monetary policy 
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tools, both conventional and unconventional, and whether these relationship change during the 
three samples? What are the relationships between monetary shocks and market indexes? As 
federal fund rate approaches zero bound, is it still effective in imparting desired impacts on the 
target variables? Does change in total asset holding by Federal Reserve have any impact as 
monetary policy tool during the QE regime? What is the impact of FEDs change in asset 
holding in special programs on bank stock returns? 
Consistent with these questions and our core arguments, we summarize the testable 
hypotheses as follows: 
 
Testable Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I Monetary shocks, conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools, market 
indexes, bond-spreads, and target other variables do not exhibit any evidence of regime 
change in a sense that both their means and their variances are not significantly 
different during pre-QE and QE samples. 
Hypothesis II Federal Reserves’ total asset holding in special programs is an efficient monetary tool 
during QE-regime as compared to pre-QE regime. 
 
Our last hypothesis represents the question about how monetary shocks and FEDs total 
asset holding may impact bank stocks during pre-QE and QE regimes; accordingly, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis III Monetary shocks and FED’s total asset holding may have different impacts over the 
banking stocks during pre-QE and QE regimes 
 
1.3.5  Empiric Specifications 
1.3.5.1  Impact on financial markets at aggregate level: VAR approach 
 Pedroni (2004) provides a lucid description on some frequently cited econometric 
concerns over the use of cointegration tests and other time series estimation methods. 
Structural breaks in time series data and shorter sample period are the two prominent 
impediments for estimating consistent and robust cointegrating equations. Pedroni (2004) 
argues that using a higher frequency data may not necessarily eliminate such estimation 
problems; Pedroni (2004) provides two alternate frameworks as solutions, first, by increasing 
the number of cross-sections to allow more variations in the data where possible and, second by 
continuing with a more conventional VAR (Vector Auto-Regressive) analysis framework. Since 
this paper focuses on only the United States monetary regime, we cannot use the Panel 
Cointegration technique; rather we use VAR approach in analyzing the impact of QE regime at 
aggregate level following the Pedroni(2004) arguments. 
In this paper, we report that the time series properties and descriptive statistics of the 
target variables for the three possible sample periods: overall period, pre-Quantitative Easing 
period, and Quantitative Easing period. As we focus our analysis on only United States dataset 
and its monetary policy regime; we do not use a panel cointegration framework; rather, we 
focus on VAR analysis for the three sample periods and related pair-wise Granger causality 
relationships among the variables. We follow a three step process to decompose and analyze 
the causality between monetary policy tools and target variables. First, we analyze the 
causality between monetary policy tools and monetary shocks that are the possible 
transmission channel. Next, we analyze the causality between monetary shocks and target 
variables (i.e. market index, bond spreads, and others). And, finally we discuss the combined 
effect of the earlier two by analyzing causality between monetary policy tools and target 
variables. 
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1.3.5.2  Monetary Impact on Bank Stocks: Panel Regression Approach 
Flannery and James (1984) is one of the early papers to provide a framework about how 
interest rates may affect common stock returns of financial institutions. In their empiric 
specification, Flannery and James (1984) extend the market model by including holding period 
return on default-free bond index: 
  =    		   
 
    ̃                                      …   …   … (3) 
 
More recently, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) decompose monetary shocks into expected 
and unexpected components and use equation (4) specification to analyze stock reaction to 
FED’s monetary shock components; Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) document that only 
unexpected shocks matter and they extend equation (4) by interacting unexpected shock 
component with FOMC meeting dummies and others variables of interest.  
  =      
  
     
  ̃        …   …   … (4) 
 
We use the Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) framework to analyze the impact of monetary 
shocks on stock returns as given in equation (4). Besides, we also analyze if there is any 
difference among bank with different asset sizes. Accordingly, we sort the banks and rank them 
into three size categories “small”, “middle” and “large” for lower 33% banks, middle 34% banks 
and large 33% banks of the sample. To analyze the impact of bank size, small banks are held as 
base case and size dummies for “middle” and “big” are included as an extension of equation (4) 
specification, as shown in equation (5). Table 10 reports the panel estimates for equation (4) and 
equation (5). 
  =       
  
     
  
                  
  
       
  ̃    …    (5) 
 
To analyze whether monetary shocks have any differential impact of stock returns 
during QE and non-QE regime, we consider non-QE regime as the base case and then include 
“QE” as a dummy for QE regime. Bernanke (2004) argues that change in FED’s total asset 
holding in special purchase programs may have impact on financial markets during QE period. 
To justify Bernanke (2004) argument, we include change in FED’s total asset holding in special 
purchase programs and interact that with QE dummy in equation (6). We provide four 
alternate versions of panel estimations for equation (6). First, we estimate equation (6) for 
overall sample without differentiating bank size. Later we estimate equation (6) for small, 
medium and large banks separately; Table 11 summarizes the empiric findings.  
  =     
  
      
     !"##$
   (6) 
          %    %  
  
  %    
  
          %      !"##$
  ̃      
 
We also analyze if there is any abnormal return in bank stocks for the opening and 
closure events of asset purchase programs initiated by the FED following the global financial 
crisis. We use separate dummies for individual events and interact the dummies with 
unexpected shocks using a similar approach as in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Equation (7) 
represents the empiric specification; Table 12 reports empiric evidence for the overall bank 
sample, and also for small, medium and large banks separately. 
  =    
  
     
     &, ($)**+,
  
    ̃ 
(7) 
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1.4 Descriptive Statistics 
1.4.1 Monetary policy tools, Market Indexes and Bond Spread 
Table 01 reports the descriptive statistics and time series properties for weekly 
observations of four market indexes, three bond spreads and conventional and unconventional 
(asset side) monetary policy tools during three sample periods: a) Overall period (December 18, 
2002 to November 30, 2011), b) Pre Quantitative Easing Period (December 18, 2002 to 
December 24, 2008), and c) QE Period (December 31, 2008 to November 30, 2011) in Panel A, 
B and C respectively. Four monetary policy variables are: DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %), 
TOT as total holding (in billion dollars) in special asset purchase programs by Federal Reserve 
System, M1 in Narrow Money (in billion dollars), nonM1 as components of M2 not included in 
M1 billion dollars). For the overall period, maximum and minimum of DFF (Federal Fund 
rate) are 5.41% and 0.06% that reveals the decreasing fund rate set by the Federal Reserve 
leading to the financial crisis and maintaining at an almost zero threshold. TOT represents the 
aggregate holding of different assets held by the FED and shows significant variation during 
the two sub-samples: pre-QE and QE samples; as FED’s involvement in asset purchase 
programs increase substantially during the QE regime. Mean value of TOT is around 162 
billion dollar during pre-QE period where as it increases substantially up-to 1.28 trillion dollar. 
During the QE-period, because of FED’s active monetary stance, both M1 and non-M1 
components of M2 also rise significantly.  
Three bond spreads are: AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread (in %), BBB as BBB 
option-adjusted spread (in %), and CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread (in %). Four Market 
Indices are: DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, TWEX as change in 
major trade-weighted exchange index, SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index and VIX as change 
in Implied Volatility Index on S&P500. Mean option-adjusted bond spread for all three types of 
bonds: AAA, BBB and CCC grades are high during QE period that reveals higher credit risk 
related with the downward business cycle. Panel D presents Welch t-statistics of difference in 
means and F-statistics of variance comparisons that are generally statistically significant at 1%. 
Such results are consistent with the argument that during QE period, both Federal Reserve 
Systems liability-based tools (like: M1 and M2) and asset based tools (TOT) and Federal Fund 
Rate (DFF) exhibits properties of regime changes. For the bond spreads and Market index 
return, we note that only means are significantly different but the variances are rather not 
different during the pre-QE and QE sample periods. For VIX and Trade-weighted foreign 
exchange index, none of the test statics is significant. To summarize, results support regime 
changes in monetary policy tools and market indexes during the QE and pre-QE periods, 
consistent with the Hypothesis I. 
 
1.4.2 Expected and Unexpected Monetary Shocks 
We calculate expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks by using equation (1) 
and (2) respectively as given by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Table 02 presents the summary 
statistics of expected and unexpected shocks components for overall sample, pre-QE sample 
and QE sample period in Panel A, B and C respectively. Results suggest that mean unexpected 
shock of positive 2.03 basis points during overall sample period is largely contributed by 
generally positive and large shocks during pre-QE sample as the mean for QE sample is merely 
0.46 basis points and on the negative side. Summary statistics of expected shock is quiet similar 
to unexpected shocks but otherwise different in sign. Panel D captures most important findings 
of the Table 02 that for both expected and unexpected shocks, both mean and variance are 
significantly different during pre-QE and QE samples. Such findings are essentially consistent 
with the hypothesis that monetary shocks are likely to be different during QE regime. 
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Table 01 
Descriptive statistics of Major Market Indexes and Monetary Policy Tools 
 
Table 01 reports descriptive statistics and time series properties for Major market indexes and monetary policy tools during three sample periods: (a) Overall 
period, (b) Pre-QE Period, and (c) QE Period in Panel A, B and C respectively. Four monetary policy variables are: (i) DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , (ii) 
TOT as total holding (in million dollars) in special asset purchase programs by Federal Reserve System, (iii) M1 in Narrow Money (in billion dollars), (iv) 
nonM1 as components of M2 not included in M1 (in billion dollars). Three bond spreads are: (i) AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread (in %), (ii) BBB as BBB 
option-adjusted spread (in %), and (iii) CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread (in %). Four Market Indices are: (i) DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial 
Average Index, (ii) TWEX as change in major trade-weighted exchange index, (iii) SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index and (iv) VIX as change in Implied 
Volatility Index on S&P500. Panel D repots Welch t-statistics of mean difference and F-statistics of difference in variance for different variables during QE 
and Pre-QE sub-sample period. AR(p) is selected based on AIC (Akaike Information Criteria). As M1, nonM1 and TOT data are available at weekly frequency, 
all variables are in weekly frequency.  
Panel A: Overall Period (12/18/2002 to 11/30/2011) 
DFF TOT M1 nonM1 AAA BBB CCC DJIA TWEX SNP500 VIX 
 Mean 2.0233 514811.80 1499.82 5922.96 0.9810 2.2802 10.7686 0.0089 -0.0257 0.0102 0.0208 
Maximum 5.4100 1764705.00 2198.10 7509.40 5.8800 7.9800 40.1700 4.2408 1.6078 4.3491 33.6343 
Minimum 0.0600 36681.00 1220.10 4547.20 0.4900 1.1000 4.1900 -7.8733 -2.6556 -9.0350 -18.1112 
Std. Dev. 1.9000 593860.00 226.93 880.85 0.7940 1.4843 6.1853 1.1942 0.5008 1.3005 6.5241 
Obs. 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 
Panel B: Pre QE Period (12/18/2002 to 12/24/2008) 
Mean 0.1467 1277540.00 1791.93 6969.76 1.0820 3.0541 13.1048 0.1359 -0.0553 0.1592 -0.1577 
Maximum 0.2400 1584817.00 2198.10 7509.40 5.8800 7.3200 36.1000 4.2408 1.2829 4.3491 33.1579 
Minimum 0.0600 1038151.00 1560.50 6723.70 0.5800 1.8500 7.4900 -4.6249 -1.5273 -4.4152 -18.1112 
Std. Dev. 0.0466 131294.50 167.81 219.95 0.9171 1.4892 6.4963 1.2252 0.5207 1.3504 7.0825 
Obs. 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Panel C: QE Period (12/24/2008 to 11/30/2011) 
Mean 0.1467 1277540.00 1791.93 6969.76 1.0820 3.0541 13.1048 0.1359 -0.0553 0.1592 -0.1577 
Maximum 0.2400 1584817.00 2198.10 7509.40 5.8800 7.3200 36.1000 4.2408 1.2829 4.3491 33.1579 
Minimum 0.0600 1038151.00 1560.50 6723.70 0.5800 1.8500 7.4900 -4.6249 -1.5273 -4.4152 -18.1112 
Std. Dev. 0.0466 131294.50 167.81 219.95 0.9171 1.4892 6.4963 1.2252 0.5207 1.3504 7.0825 
Obs. 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Panel D: QE and Pre-QE Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation 
Welch t (28.67)c 3.07 b 2.20b 4.22c 2.95b 12.16c 5.47c 2.26b (1.51) 2.40b (0.29) 
F-stat 1333c 3.08c 13.46c 2.12b 1.15 1.18 1.13 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.06 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 02 
Descriptive Statistics of Expected and Unexpected Shocks 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 02 present Descriptive Statistics of Unexpected Monetary Shock (UNEXPSHOCK) and Expected Monetary Shock (EXSHOCK) for: a) the full 
sample period, b) Pre-Quantitative Easing Period, and c) Quantitative Easing Period. Unexpected and Expected monetary policy shocks are calculated based on the formula (as 
described by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). 
 
UNEXP (Unexpected Shock):   .. (1) EXP (Expected Shock):  .. (2) 
 
Panel D reports Welch t-statistics for comparison of means and F-statistics for sample variance comparison. All data are daily frequency. Superscripts of a, b and c correspond 
to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
Full Sample Pre-QE Sample QE Sample  QE and Pre-QE 
  UNEXP EXP UNEXP EXP UNEXP EXP Test Stat Unexpected Expected 
 Mean 0.0203 -0.0247 0.0297 -0.0352 -0.0046 0.0047 Welch t-stat 6.3456c -7.2928c 
 Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0050 0.0050 
 Maximum 1.5925 1.7650 1.5925 1.7650 0.1000 0.0900 F-stat 111.5799c 131.6742c 
 Minimum -1.9450 -1.3650 -1.9450 -1.3650 -0.0800 -0.0990 
 Std. Dev. 0.1690 0.1717 0.1968 0.1994 0.0186 0.0174 
 Skewness -1.1669 0.5410 -1.1543 0.6404 0.8310 -0.2474 
 Kurtosis 29.9901 21.2841 22.5648 16.1564 8.5856 9.0282   
Sample 7/5/2000 to 12/15/2011 7/5/2000 to 12/15/2009 12/16/2009 to 12/15/2011   
 No. of Obs. 1858 1355 503   
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
∑
=
−−=∆
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Table 03 
Unit Root Tests of Monetary Shocks, Monetary Policy Tools, Market Indexes and Bond Spreads 
 
Panel A through Panel C in Table 03 report Unit Root Test results for Monetary Shocks, Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy tools, Market 
Indexes, Traded weighted foreign exchange index and Bond Spreads for: (a) Overall sample, (b) Pre-QE sample, and (c) QE sample period; using Augmented 
Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) with intercept and trend in the mean equation. Lag length corresponds to lags selected and used in ADF statistics chosen on the 
basis of AIC (Akaike Information Criteria). 
 
 Panel A: Overall Period (12/18/2002 to 11/30/2011) 
 UNEXP EXP DFF TOT M1 nonM1 AAA BBB CCC DJIA TWEX SP500 VIX 
ADF at Level t-stat -10.65c -14.96 c -1.01 -2.70 1.49 -1.96 -1.95 -2.20 -2.56 -17.35c -21.97c -17.52c -21.86c 
lag length 2 1 2 4 3 0 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 
ADF at First Diff t-stat -13.30c -12.13c -20.18c -6.66c -18.96c -18.00c -13.99c -7.94c -9.14c -14.31c -14.51c -14.85c -14.76c 
lag length 11 12 1 5 2 1 3 1 2 6 6 6 0 
I(p) process 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
No. of Obs.  462  462  462  462  462  462 462 462 462 462 462 462 462 
 
 
Panel B: Pre QE Period (12/18/2002 to 12/24/2008) 
 UNEXP EXP DFF TOT M1 nonM1 AAA BBB CCC DJIA TWEX SP500 VIX 
ADF at Level t-stat -14.65c -12.45c 2.06 7.56 -0.977 0.335 -0.66 -0.74 1.00 -16.81c -17.69c -13.49c -17.95c 
lag length 0 1 2 15 14 2 2 2 13 2 0 0 0 
ADF at First Diff t-stat -10.88c -9.97c -17.16c -4.82c -1.04c -16.51c -8.00c -8.58c -5.45c -13.26c -11.92c -11.61c -15.14c 
lag length 11 12 1 3 13 1 1 0 12 0 6 6 3 
I(p) process 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
No. of Obs. 315   315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
 
 
Panel C: QE Period (12/24/2008 to 11/30/2011) 
 UNEXP EXP DFF TOTSPEC M1 NONM1 AAA BBB CCC DJIA TWEX SP500 VIX 
ADF at Level t-stat -9.80c -9.72c -3.07 -1.20 -0.71 -0.84 -1.98 -1.29 -1.42 -12.42c -13.08c -11.01c -13.00c 
lag length 0 0 1 12 3 0 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 
ADF at First Diff t-stat -8.53c -10.09c -17.26c -5.89c -11.94c -13.09c -9.29c -6.66c -7.74c -10.53c -9.16c -10.87c -10.36c 
lag length 6 7 0 11 2 0 3 1 1 6 5 6 6 
I(p) process 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
No. of Obs.  147  147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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1.4.3 Unit Root Tests 
In Table 01 and Table 02, we report the descriptive statistics of monetary policy tools, 
the market indexes, bond spreads and other target variables; and expected and unexpected 
shocks, respectively. Panel A, B and C of Table 03 report Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests for stationarity for unexpected and expected shocks, DFF (Federal Fund Rate), M1 and 
M2 at their levels and at their first differences. Test results suggest that both expected and 
unexpected monetary shocks are generally I(0) process i.e. stationary at their levels and at their 
first differences as well in all three sample periods. However other monetary policy tools are 
generally I(1) processes during all three samples. One important finding from Panel A, B and C 
is that Federal Fund Rate is rather an I(1) process which is in stark contrast with the data 
generation process of expected and unexpected monetary shocks. One plausible implication of 
monetary shocks being I (0) process is that by definition (see: equation (1) and (2)) the process 
is differenced and hence both shocks are rather I (0). 
 
1.5. Granger Causality Analysis 
We analyze a three step procedure to analyze the causality between the monetary tools, 
monetary shocks and market indexes, bond spreads and other target variables. We conduct 
extensive pair-wise causality analysis for all these variables; we report detailed results on 
causality in tabular format in the Appendix B. 
 
1.5.1 Causality between Monetary Policy Tools and Monetary Shocks 
On the causality between conventional monetary policy tools; and monetary shocks, 
results suggest that expected shock has causality over non-M1 components of M2 during QE 
regime but the relationship is altered otherwise reverse direction during the overall sample 
period. For DFF and expected shocks, there is no clear causality as both are Granger caused by 
each other. For other variables, however, there is no significant evidence of causality. For 
unexpected shocks, unexpected shocks have causality over DFF during QE regime. Besides, 
non-M1 components of M2 have causality effect on unexpected shocks during overall period 
that is largely driven by the dominant impact during pre-QE period. For QE regime, there is, 
however, no such causality relationship between non-M1 components of M2 and unexpected 
shocks. 
About the causality relationships between conventional or liability-side components 
(M1 and non-M1 components of M2), and unconventional or asset-side components, (total 
holding of special program security holding), we find that during QE regime, all the 
conventional policy tools have significant causality relationship over TOTSPEC. However, 
during pre-QE and overall period, such causality does not persist generally. However, for 
causality between: monetary shocks and unconventional monetary tools, results suggest that 
there is no clear causality during QE regime as both expected and unexpected shocks has 
causality over TOT and again TOT has causality over the shocks. During the overall and pre-
QE sample, there is no evidence of causality relationship. 
 
1.5.2 Causality between Monetary Shocks and Market Indexes and Bond Spreads 
Granger Causality between Monetary Shocks and Major market indexes (DJIA as 
return on Dow Jones Industrial Average Index and SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index); and 
change in major trade-weighted exchange index, and Implied Volatility Index on S&P500 
reveal some interesting findings. Results show that there is no significant causality relationship 
between the market indexes and expected monetary shocks in any of the three sample periods. 
For unexpected shocks, however, unexpected shocks do have causality over DJIA returns and 
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SNP500 returns during all of the three sample periods. But unexpected shocks have causality 
over VIX index during overall period that is largely due to the causality persistent during pre-
QE period and not QE regime otherwise. Causality relationship between expected and 
unexpected shocks is however only vivid during QE regime when unexpected shocks have 
causality over expected shocks. During other period, there is no clear causality as both 
expected and unexpected shocks are caused by each other. 
Results on Granger causality between Monetary Shocks and the three bond spreads 
(AAA option-adjusted spread, BBB option-adjusted spread, and CCC option-adjusted spread) 
suggest that AAA has causality over expected shocks During QE regime. However, expected 
shock itself has causality effect over BBB and CCC during the QE period. For unexpected 
shock, it has clear causality over AAA and BBB during QE regime but its impact on CCC is not 
clear as both CCC and unexpected shocks are caused by each other. 
We also analyze Granger Causality between Monetary Shocks and daily swap rates for 
8 maturities, 1 yr, 2 yr, 3 yr, 4 yr, 5 yr, 7 yr, 10 yr and 30 yr (DSWP1 through DWSP30), and 
a commercial papers of different maturities for both financial and non-financial firms with AA-
rating. Results suggest that only 4 year SWAP has clearly observable causality over expected 
shocks and SWAPs with 4 year and less maturity have rather ambiguous causality as these 
SWAPs and expected shocks have causality over each others during QE regime. During the 
pre-QE regime, however, SWAPs of 4 year and higher maturity generally have causality over 
expected shocks. But, for the overall sample, expected shocks rather have causality over 4 year, 
7 year and 10 year SWAPs only. During QE regime, unexpected shocks have rather clearly 
defined causality over all but 10 year maturity SWAPs. But during overall and pre-QE sample, 
the relationships are ambiguous. Besides, results also suggest that both expected and 
unexpected shocks have generally significant causality over both financial and non-financial 
commercial papers during QE regime. However, causality relations are rather ambiguous 
during other sample periods.  
 
1.5.3 Causality between Monetary Policy Tools and Market Indexes and Bond Spreads 
In this section, we report the combined impact of monetary policy and market index and 
bond spreads. Results suggest that all the market indexes and three bond-spreads generally 
Granger cause DFF during the overall sample period which effect is largely dominated by the 
causality prevalent during pre-QE period. However, during QE period such causality does not 
hold. It reveals some important implications. First, during QE period DFF is not responsive to 
market forces. Second, DFF also generally does not have causality over the market indexes and 
three bond markets in any of the three periods. These two implications are consistent with the 
argument that as Federal Fund Rate approaches zero-bound, as a policy tools its effectiveness 
diminishes. Results also suggest that log(TOT) Granger causes AAA and CCC bond spreads 
during QE sample period only. For BBB bond spread, the causality is not clear as BBB spread 
also causes log(TOT). Besides, log(TOT) Granger causes SNP500 return only during pre-QE 
period and that is effect is dominant enough to be evident for the overall sample period but not 
during QE period. For other market indexes, there is no significant causality relationship in 
any of the three sample periods. 
 
1.6. Effects of Monetary Shocks on Market Indexes 
 In the previous section, we discuss the nature of pair-wise causality relationships 
between monetary shocks, conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools and their 
impact on market indexes and bond spreads. In continuation with that discussion, this section 
discusses key findings on the magnitude of these causality relationships during the three 
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periods: overall period, pre-QE period and QE period; by using VAR (Vector Auto Regressive) 
estimations. We limit our analysis to the extent of VAR estimation following Pedroni (2004) 
arguments. Pedroni summarizes the shorter time span as a key impediment to robust and 
consistent estimation for co-integration tests. As solutions to the problem, Pedroni points out 
two plausible options: first, by extending the data set by allowing additional cross-sections and 
then using a Panel Co-integration approach, and second, by using more conventional VAR 
analysis technique. Between these two alternatives, we skip the first choice as our study focuses 
on Quantitative Easing impact on United States only. Accordingly, we use VAR technique and 
summarize the key results in this section. 
 
1.6.1 Monetary Policy Tools and Monetary Shocks 
Panel A, B and C of Table 04 report VAR estimates for a) conventional monetary policy 
tools: DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %), percentage change in M1 (Narrow Money), percentage 
change in nonM1 (components of M2 not included in M1), and b) two types of Monetary 
Shocks and percentage change in unconventional asset-side component of TOT (total holding 
in special asset purchase programs by Federal Reserve System) for three sample periods. 
Results suggest that 1% change in previous period and previous second period Federal 
Fund Rate (DFF) are likely to impart a negative 16.8 basis point and a positive 17.20 basis 
point change in elasticity for Total special programs holding (% ∆ in TOT) respectively during 
the overall period. However, during the pre-QE period, the economic significance is much less 
prominent as DFF is only significant at second period over % ∆ in TOT and in QE regime 
there is no evidence of any economic and statistical significance. Such result is consistent with 
the nature of DFF as Federal Funds approaching the zero-bound become less effective. Impact 
of Federal Fund Rate on change in elasticity for non-M1 components of M2 (% ∆ in NONM1) 
also is almost similar in magnitude but otherwise different in signs in the previous period and 
previous second period estimates. DFF is generally ineffective over the change in elasticity of 
M1 (% ∆ in M1) and two monetary shocks in all three samples. 
Although previous period and previous second period change in elasticity in M1 are 
significant in explaining changes in elasticity for non-M1 components of M2 and total special 
programs holdings by the Federal Systems (TOT) during the overall period, during the pre-
QE and QE such results are not robust consistent with the structural changes in the interaction 
between Monetary policy tools. Most important findings from Table 04 concerning our study 
are the impacts of change in elasticity of total assets held in special programs by the FED. 
Results suggest that, among the three sample periods, change in elasticity of total assets held in 
special programs has only significant impact on expected and unexpected monetary shocks 
during the QE regime. Generally, other variables have no significant impact on monetary 
shocks in the three sub-samples which suggest that Federal Reserves’ special asset holding is 
quiet effective in terms of channeling the monetary shocks further. 
 
1.6.2 Monetary Shocks and Market Indexes 
Panel A, B and C of Table 05 report VAR estimates for; a) two types of Monetary 
Shocks; i) Expected and ii) Unexpected shocks (all in % interest); and b) returns on four market 
indexes: i) DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, ii) TWEX as change in 
major trade-weighted exchange index, iii) SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index and iv) VIX as 
Implied Volatility Index on S&P500; for three sample periods. 
Results suggest that both expected and unexpected shocks have statistically and 
economically significant effects on DJIA and SNP500 returns in all three sample periods.  
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Table 04 
VAR Estimation for Monetary Shocks and Monetary Tools 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 07 report VAR estimates for; a) conventional monetary policy tools: i) DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , and Federal Reserve 
System’s liability side tools such as: ii) % change in M1 (Narrow Money), iii) % change  in NONM1 (components of M2 not included in M1); b) two types of 
Monetary Shocks; and c) % change  in unconventional asset-side component of TOTSPEC (total holding in special asset purchase programs by Federal 
Reserve System) for three sample periods: a) Overall period (December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011), b) Pre Quantitative Easing (QE) Period (December 
18, 2002 to December 24, 2008), and c) QE Period (December 31, 2008 to November 30, 2011). 
 
Panel A: Overall Period Panel B: Pre QE Period Panel C: QE Period 
 DFF 
%∆ 
M1 
%∆ 
nonM1 
%∆ 
TOT EXP 
UN 
EXP DFF 
%∆ 
M1 
%∆ 
nonM1 
%∆ 
TOT EXP 
UN 
EXP DFF 
%∆ 
M1 
%∆ 
nonM1 
%∆ 
TOT EXP 
UN 
EXP 
DFF(-1) 0.95c -0.01 0.003c -0.16c 0.12b -0.08 0.93c -0.01a 0.01b -0.15b 0.12 -0.10 0.69c 0.01 -0.02 0.19 0.03 -0.08 
DFF(-2) 0.04 0.01 -0.003c 0.17c -0.12a 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.01a 0.15b -0.11 0.09 0.23 -0.02 0.01 -0.18 -0.03 0.03 
%∆M1(-1) -2.91c -0.08 0.06c 1.57c 0.73 -1.33c -4.61c 0.04 0.02 2.61c 1.33 -1.91b -0.05 -0.24c 0.12c -0.06 -0.105 -0.15 
%∆M1(-2) 0.71 -0.26 c 0.05c 1.34c -1.39b 0.39 1.02 -0.31c 0.05c 1.75a -2.01a 0.21 -0.38b -0.21c 0.05a 0.38b 0.20a -0.28a 
%∆nonM1(-1) -13.66c 0.72c -0.03 1.64 7.02c -10.21c -21.05c 0.89c -0.11c 2.98 10.93c -15.87c 0.41 0.36 0.08 -0.18 -1.29c 0.37 
%∆nonM1(-2) -5.20c 0.11 -0.11c 3.40 -2.66 -3.08 -8.86c 0.03 -0.15c 5.06 -4.37 -5.77c -0.94 0.08 -0.03 0.24 0.94c -1.01b 
%∆TOT(-1) -0.10c -0.006b 0.002c -0.41c -0.07 -0.01 -0.11b -0.01 0.01 -0.41c -0.07 -0.01 -0.36c -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.14c -0.19c 
%∆TOT(-2) -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.15c -0.08a 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.16c -0.09 0.01 -0.08 0.08c -0.03c -0.27c 0.01 -0.03 
EXP(-1) -0.12c 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.35c -0.12c -0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.34c -0.11a -0.21 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.23b -0.18 
EXP(-2) 0.16c 0.00 -0.00 0.08 -0.20c 0.04 0.15c 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.19c 0.03 0.38c 0.00 -0.01 -0.17 -0.32c 0.45c 
UNEXP(-1) -0.63c 0.01 -0.004c 0.14a 0.01 0.20 -0.59c 0.01 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.22c -0.49c -0.06 0.03 -0.48c -0.05c 0.12 
UNEXP(-2) 0.10 -0.01 0.002 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.21b 0.19 
C 0.01 0.002c 0.001c -0.01 0.004 0.005 0.02 0.01 0.01c -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Adj. R-sq 0.99 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.99 0.150 0.07 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.79 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.14 
No. of Obs. 462 462 462 462 462 462 315 315 315 315 315 315 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 05 
VAR Estimation for Monetary Shocks and Market Indexes 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 08 report VAR estimates for; a) two types of Monetary Shocks; i) Expected and ii) Unexpected shocks (all in % interest); and b) 
returns on four market indexes: i) DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, ii) TWEX as change in major trade-weighted exchange index [do 
not report], iii) SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index and iv) VIX as Implied Volatility Index on S&P500; for three sample periods: a) Overall period (December 
18, 2002 to November 30, 2011), b) Pre Quantitative Easing (QE) Period (December 18, 2002 to December 24, 2008), and c) QE Period (December 31, 2008 to 
November 30, 2011). We only report VAR estimates for monetary shocks and market indexes because of space constraint. 
 
 
Panel A: Overall Period Panel B: Pre QE Period Panel C: QE Period 
 EXP UNEXP DJIA SP500 VIX EXP UNEXP DJIA SP500 VIX EXP UNEXP DJIA SP500 VIX 
EXP(-1) 0.395c -0.143c 1.776c 1.848c -6.366b 0.394c -0.135a 1.766c 1.805c -5.768a 0.007 0.012 27.417c 32.073c -187.569c 
EXP(-2) -0.236c 0.059 1.152b 1.206b -5.705a -0.249c 0.069 1.206c 1.296c -6.321b -0.335c 0.458c -11.078 -7.657 74.367 
UNEXP(-1) 0.177c 0.102a 1.061a 1.078a -4.243 0.187c 0.096 1.038a 1.009 -3.818 -0.170c 0.225c 15.528c 20.892c -119.171c 
UNEXP(-2) -0.175c -0.052 1.351c 1.471c -2.762 -0.174c -0.056 1.449c 1.587c -3.579 -0.287c 0.256c -13.674a -12.918 67.204 
DJIA(-1) 0.028 -0.033 0.354 0.418 -0.210 0.040 -0.051 0.545a 0.636b -0.702 0.011c -0.013c -0.385 -0.401 2.664 
DJIA(-2) 0.016 -0.011 0.024 0.019 0.083 0.027 -0.033 0.174 0.141 -0.881 -0.001 0.008 -0.344 -0.323 2.003 
TWEX(-1) 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.010 -0.417 0.003 0.015 -0.115 -0.133 0.357 -0.001 -0.001 0.124 0.161 -1.365 
TWEX(-2) -0.001 -0.013 -0.079 -0.032 0.017 -0.001 -0.020 -0.152 -0.149 0.636 -0.001 -0.000 -0.015 0.108 -0.947 
SP5(-1) -0.024 0.030 -0.118 -0.145 -0.353 -0.032 0.046 -0.224 -0.281 -0.074 -0.009c 0.011b 0.144 0.170 -1.506 
SP5(-2) -0.011 0.008 0.060 0.037 -0.105 -0.022 0.030 -0.027 -0.015 0.482 0.004 -0.010b 0.052 -0.016 -0.314 
VIX(-1) -0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.012 -0.101 -0.001 -0.001 0.020 0.023 -0.148c -0.001 0.001 -0.046a -0.046 0.127 
VIX(-2) 0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.010 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.018 0.011 -0.025 0.001c -0.001 -0.031 -0.038 0.216 
C 0.020c -0.021c -0.001 0.002 0.123 0.029c -0.029c -0.037 -0.044 0.169 0.001 -0.004c 0.137 0.183 -0.429 
 Adj. R-sq. 0.076 0.050 0.061 0.058 0.001 0.064 0.045 0.129 0.120 0.020 0.175 0.116 0.047 0.058 0.056 
No. of Obs. 462 462 462 462 462 315 315 315 315 315 147 147 147 147 147 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 06 
VAR Estimation for Monetary Shocks and Bond Spreads 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 09 report VAR estimates for; a) two types of Monetary Shocks; i) Expected and ii) Unexpected shocks (all in % interest); and b) 
three Bond Spreads : i) AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread (in %), ii) BBB as BBB option-adjusted spread (in %), and iii) CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread 
(in %); for three sample periods: a) Overall period (December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011), b) Pre Quantitative Easing (QE) Period (December 18, 2002 to 
December 24, 2008), and c) QE Period (December 31, 2008 to November 30, 2011).  
 
 
Panel A: Overall Period Panel B: Pre QE Period Panel C: QE Period 
 EXP UNEXP AAA BBB CCC EXP UNEXP AAA BBB CCC EXP UNEXP AAA BBB CCC 
EXP(-1) 0.384c -0.159c -0.007 -0.051 -0.391 0.383c -0.189c 0.016 0.008 -0.101 0.033 -0.003 -4.178b -1.405b -14.091c 
EXP(-2) -0.228c 0.050 0.070 -0.071b 0.284 -0.215c 0.036 0.086c -0.033 0.425 -0.337c 0.507c -1.278 -0.635 -3.258 
UNEXP(-1) 0.183c 0.086 -0.086 -0.054 -0.497 0.213c 0.057 -0.004 0.035 -0.186 -0.117 0.142 -1.164 -1.048b -6.420 
UNEXP(-2) -0.162c -0.071 0.152 -0.016 0.165 -0.164c -0.098 0.179c 0.005 0.275 -0.280c 0.279c -1.307 0.158 2.678 
AAA(-1) -0.011 -0.047 0.969c 0.029 0.085 -0.275c -0.286c 1.023c 0.084 1.139c 0.004 -0.007 0.723c 0.007 -0.162 
AAA(-2) 0.042 0.007 -0.073 0.050c 0.175 0.274b 0.057 0.139b 0.276c 0.395 -0.004 0.003 -0.111 0.038 0.229 
BBB(-1) 0.020 -0.112 0.263c 1.366c 0.948c 0.169 0.041 0.031 1.119c -0.065 0.053c -0.048b -0.552 1.020c -1.415 
BBB(-2) -0.028 0.121 -0.210c -0.396c -0.816c -0.151 0.100 -0.101 -0.320c -0.613 -0.043c 0.042c 0.326 -0.187b 0.971 
CCC(-1) -0.010 0.011 0.015 0.031c 1.257c -0.014 0.015 -0.021c 0.026c 1.227c -0.006c 0.008c 0.160c 0.048c 1.367c 
CCC(-2) 0.007 -0.007 -0.018 -0.035c -0.327c 0.008 -0.020 0.018c -0.021c -0.248c 0.004c -0.006c -0.062 -0.019 -0.300c 
C 0.044c -0.039c 0.014c 0.030c 0.193c 0.057c -0.040c 0.016b 0.010 0.078 -0.003 -0.002 -0.193c 0.067c 0.336a 
Adj. R-sq. 0.089 0.070 0.954 0.997 0.987 0.087 0.085 0.989 0.997 0.988 0.177 0.118 0.924 0.997 0.987 
No. of Obs. 462 462 462 462 462 315 315 315 315 315 147 147 147 147 147 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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However, the magnitudes of their impacts during pre-QE and overall period are much lower 
than those during the QE period. Besides the signs of VAR estimations in QE sample are 
otherwise different and exhibits tendency of reversion over the previous first and second 
periods.  For example, 1% change in previous period expected shock is likely to impart 1.77 
basis changes in DJIA and 1.85 basis changes in SNP500 return during overall period; and the 
impact is similar during pre-QE sample. However, during QE period, only previous period 
shocks are significant; like: 1% change in expected shock is likely to impart 27 basis changes in 
DJIA and 32 basis changes in SNP500. During all three sample periods, monetary shocks have 
no significant impact on changes in trade-weighted exchange index. However, for VIX, 
expected monetary shocks are significant in all three samples but unexpected shocks are rather 
significant in only QE sample period at their previous periods. 
Later, in Panel A, B and C of Table 06, we report VAR estimates for; a) two types of 
Monetary Shocks: Expected and Unexpected shocks; and b) three Bond Spreads: AAA as AAA 
option-adjusted spread (in %), BBB as BBB option-adjusted spread, and CCC as CCC option-
adjusted spread (in %); for three sample periods. Results are rather straightforward to 
summarize. During overall and pre-QE sample periods, the monetary shocks are not significant 
in explaining any of the three bond-spreads. However, for QE regime, expected shocks at their 
previous first period are significant for all three bond-spreads and unexpected shocks at their 
previous first period are significant for only BBB bond-spreads. Results suggest that, among 
the three sample periods, monetary shocks partially explain corporate bond spreads only 
during the QE regime.  
 
1.6.3 Impact of Monetary Policy Tools on Market Indexes and Bond Spreads 
Panel A, B and C of Table 07 report VAR estimates for; a) conventional monetary tools: 
DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , and Federal Reserve System’s liability side tools such as: 
percentage change in M1 (Narrow Money), percentage change  in nonM1 (components of M2 
not included in M1), percentage change  in unconventional asset-side component TOT; and c) 
returns on four market indexes: DJIA, TWEX as change in major trade-weighted exchange 
index, SNP500 and VIX as Implied Volatility Index on S&P500 for the three sample periods. 
Results from Panel A show that, among all the monetary policy tools both conventional 
and unconventional, only percentage changes in Federal Reserve’s Total Asset held under 
Special programs in their previous period and previous second period are statistically 
significant in explaining DJIA and SNP500 returns, during the overall period. Although 
similar patter also holds during the pre-QE period, percentage change in TOT is rather not 
significant during the QE period. 
Later, Panel A, B and C of Table 08 report VAR estimates for; a) conventional monetary 
tools: DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , percentage change in M1 (Narrow Money), 
percentage change  in nonM1 (components of M2 not included in M1); b)  percentage change  
in unconventional asset-side component TOT; c) three Bond Spreads: AAA as AAA option-
adjusted spread (in %), BBB as BBB option-adjusted spread (in %), and CCC as CCC option-
adjusted spread (in %); for the three sample periods. 
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Table 07 
VAR Estimation for Monetary tools and Market Indexes 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 10 report VAR estimates for; a) conventional monetary tools: i) DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , and Federal Reserve System’s 
liability side tools such as: ii) % change in M1 (Narrow Money), iii) % change  in NONM1 (components of M2 not included in M1); b)  % change  in 
unconventional asset-side component TOTSPEC; and c) returns on four market indexes: i) DJIA return, ii) DTWEXM as change in major trade-weighted 
exchange index, iii) SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index and iv) VIX as Implied Volatility Index on S&P500; for three sample periods. We only report VAR 
estimates for market indexes because of space constraint. 
Panel A: Overall Period Panel B: Pre QE Period Panel C: QE Period 
 DJIA TWEXM SP500 VIX DJIA TWEXM SP500 VIX DJIA TWEXM SP500 VIX 
DFF(-1) -0.477 0.068 -0.468 1.583 -0.284 0.059 -0.268 0.765 1.933 0.699 4.401 -18.084 
DFF(-2) 0.510 -0.059 0.497 -1.745 0.352 -0.052 0.333 -0.958 0.845 -0.473 -0.936 -8.463 
%∆M1(-1) 2.036 -1.843 2.586 -17.480 3.557 -1.524 3.875 -33.553 -5.812 -1.853 -7.577 30.679 
%∆M1(-2) -8.543 -1.296 -7.816 54.463 1.879 -3.430 3.182 16.540 -27.355c 2.829 -27.200c 128.968c 
%∆nonM1(-1) 17.656 -7.112 15.055 -41.378 37.123 -3.208 39.053 -141.004 18.636 -15.289 8.057 -44.181 
%∆nonM1(-2) -44.426c -8.594 -41.225 249.50c 0.027 -16.263 6.734 40.961 -107.765c 3.349 -104.493c 537.911c 
%∆TOT(-1) -1.279c 0.091 -1.164c 2.243 -1.213c 0.118 -1.081c 1.696 -4.385 -1.284 -6.009 36.338 
%∆TOT(-2) -1.221c 0.036 -1.225c 4.632 -1.099c 0.053 -1.094c 4.087 3.209 -1.627 3.524 -11.662 
DJIA(-1) 0.339 0.011 0.404 -0.179 0.507 0.150 0.609b -0.673 0.076 -0.116 0.097 -0.007 
DJIA(-2) 0.030 -0.031 0.030 -0.031 0.270 0.093 0.249 -1.506 -0.258 -0.107 -0.144 1.162 
TWEXM(-1) -0.034 -0.054 -0.031 -0.220 -0.155 -0.037 -0.169 0.544 0.074 -0.106 0.108 -1.143 
TWEXM(-2) -0.082 -0.024 -0.038 0.082 -0.165 -0.017 -0.168 0.769 -0.136 0.002 -0.023 -0.232 
SP500(-1) -0.116 -0.072 -0.144 -0.388 -0.217 -0.219 -0.287 -0.096 -0.253 0.146 -0.246 0.652 
SP500(-2) 0.027 -0.002 0.001 0.142 -0.154 -0.157 -0.153 1.249 -0.071 0.232 -0.229 0.653 
VIX(-1) 0.010 -0.007 0.012 -0.102 0.019 -0.010a 0.021 -0.140 -0.035 0.009 -0.032 0.025 
VIX(-2) 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.017 -0.002 0.010 -0.019 -0.034 0.030c -0.040 0.209 
C -0.002 -0.024 0.007 0.026 -0.245 -0.012 -0.257 0.661 -0.100 -0.116 -0.159 2.828 
Adj. R-sq. 0.042 -0.001 0.032 -0.010 0.090 0.027 0.077 -0.012 0.056 -0.032 0.054 0.060 
No. of Obs. 462 462 462 462 315 315 315 315 147 147 147 147 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 08 
VAR Estimation for Monetary Policy Tools and Bond Spreads 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 11 report VAR estimates for; a) conventional monetary tools: i) DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , and Federal Reserve System’s 
liability side tools such as: ii) % change in M1 (Narrow Money), iii) % change  in NONM1 (components of M2 not included in M1); b)  % change  in 
unconventional asset-side component TOTSPEC; c) three Bond Spreads : i) AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread (in %), ii) BBB as BBB option-adjusted spread 
(in %), and iii) CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread (in %); for three sample periods: a) Overall period (December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011), b) Pre 
Quantitative Easing (QE) Period (December 18, 2002 to December 24, 2008), and c) QE Period (December 31, 2008 to November 30, 2011). We only report 
VAR estimates for bond spreads because of space constraint. 
 
Panel A: Overall Period Panel B: Pre QE Period Panel C: QE Period 
AAA BBB CCC AAA BBB CCC AAA BBB CCC 
DFF(-1) -0.068 0.016 0.075 -0.039 0.040a 0.085 0.040 -0.267 -0.020 
DFF(-2) 0.079 -0.024 -0.133 0.033 -0.039 a -0.147 0.531 0.360 0.620 
%∆M1(-1) 0.474 -0.423 0.788 0.268 -0.640 -0.608 1.520 0.100 2.068 
%∆M1(-2) 0.353 1.032c 10.468 c 1.580 c 0.544 13.436 c -1.791 1.369 3.632 
% ∆nonM1(-1) 1.443 -0.059 -12.556 1.314 0.370 -26.693 c 8.012 -1.414 5.358 
% ∆nonM1(-2) 3.446 4.209 c 19.018 3.648 b 3.208 b 7.960 3.767 3.816 27.035 
% ∆TOT(-1) 0.120 b 0.058 b 0.245 0.044 0.017 -0.046 2.223c 0.847c 5.799c 
% ∆TOT(-2) 0.052 0.049 0.332 0.017 0.009 0.127 -2.718c 0.006 -4.470 
AAA(-1) 0.946c 0.023 0.154 0.972c 0.055 0.945 0.711c 0.008 -0.182 
AAA(-2) -0.094c 0.071c 0.289 0.111 0.286c 0.293 -0.158a 0.020 0.085 
BBB(-1) 0.246c 1.359c 0.711a 0.087 1.160c 0.381 -0.337 0.985c -1.325 
BBB(-2) -0.182b -0.393c -0.632 -0.104 -0.350c -0.786 0.123 -0.155 0.832 
CCC(-1) 0.019 0.031c 1.254c -0.022c 0.027c 1.228c 0.157c 0.055c 1.392c 
CCC(-2) -0.018 -0.037c -0.345c 0.015a -0.022c -0.292c -0.055 -0.023a -0.297c 
C -0.038 0.056c 0.447c 0.046c -0.001 0.443c -0.298c 0.044 0.142 
Adj. R-sq 0.955 0.997 0.988 0.989 0.998 0.989 0.930 0.997 0.987 
No. of Obs. 462 462 462 315 315 315 147 147 147 
Superscripts of a, b and c correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Among all the conventional and non-conventional monetary policy tools, only percentage 
changes in Federal Reserve’s Total Asset holding in special programs are generally significant 
in explaining bond spreads during the Quantitative Easing regime. While during pre-QE and 
overall sample period, the impact of percentage changes of special asset holding is not robust 
and in some cases, other monetary tools are also significant.    
 
1.7. Impact of monetary shocks and alternate monetary policy on Bank 
Stocks 
Earlier in the paper, the section six discusses the impact of monetary shocks at 
aggregate level during QE and pre-QE monetary regimes. Section seven presents empiric 
evidence on whether monetary shocks have differential impacts on bank stock returns during 
changing monetary regimes; later this section also analyzes whether changes in FED’s total 
asset holding as an alternate monetary policy have impacts at bank stock level or not. Finally, 
this section also documents some evidences about which of the FED’s asset purchase window 
have impact at bank level.  
 
1.7.1 Summary Statistics of the Bank Sample 
A sample of 186 banks is selected based on availability of balance sheet information in 
the COMPUSTAT Bank Annual database and stock return data from CRSP. Banks are sorted 
by their total asset size and then ranked and categorized in three types: a) small banks that are 
ranked bottom 33%; b) medium banks that are ranked middle 33%, and c) large banks that are 
ranked top 33%. All balance sheet data used from the COMPUSTAT Bank Annuals dataset are 
annual frequency; Table 9 presents summary statistics of the key bank characteristics. Included 
variables are: AT (Bank Total Assets in million USD), CAPR (Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio – 
Combined), EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes in percentage of bank total asset) and 
LT (Total Liabilities normalized with respect to bank total asset size). As FEDs total asset 
holding in special asset programs data begins from 2002, we select a matching sample period 
from December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011; banks are ranked based on their previous year 
total asset size disclosed in the balance sheet information in the COMPUSTAT Bank Annual 
dataset. Table 9 reports the summary statistics by years as well as by bank size classifications; 
it also presents the Welch t-statistics of difference in mean among the samples. 
Results suggest that, in general, banks with larger asset size tend to have higher EBIT. 
The variations in EBIT between the large and the small, and the large and the medium banks 
are statistically significant and different; however, for the medium and the small banks 
difference in EBIT is rather insignificant. Such findings are generally robust for each year 
under the sample from 2001 to 2010. For example, in year 2001, a large bank earns an average 
702 million USD in EBIT compared to their medium size and smaller size counterpart banks 
with average EBIT of 18.52 million USD and 5.49 million USD respectively. Positive relation 
between bank size and EBIT resembles the argument of benefits from economies of scale and 
scope that larger banks enjoy over their smaller size counterparts. For CAPR and LT variables, 
there is no much difference among the large, the medium and the small ranked banks. The 
latter findings about CAPR and LT are consistent with the facts that banks as financial 
institutions are obliged to maintain a specific Capital ratio as given the regulators.  
 
 
 
 
  
 22 
 
Table 09 
Descriptive Statistics of Bank Characteristics 
 
Table 09 reports the summary statistics of the key bank characteristics of a total of 186 banks included in the sample. All information is collected from 
COMPUSTAT Bank Annual database; sample period is 2000 to 2010. Banks are ranked by their total asset size each year and categorized into three 
categories: a) small banks that are ranked bottom 33%; b) medium banks that are ranked middle 33%, and c) large banks that are ranked top 33%. Included 
variables are: AT (Bank Total Assets in million USD), CAPR3 (Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio – Combined), EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes in 
percentage of bank total asset) and LT (Total Liabilities normalized by bank total asset). 
Panel A: Bank Characteristics of Overall Sample 
 
Year: 2001  Year: 2002 
Variable Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev.  Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
AT 20280.330 695877.000 86.478 87945.410  27521.160 759246.000 110.519 115129.100 
CAPR3 14.296 49.900 9.200 4.723  14.172 48.200 8.200 4.403 
EBIT 2.062 4.849 -2.763 0.771  2.152 4.481 -3.018 0.781 
LT 0.908 0.963 0.740 0.026  0.907 0.966 0.556 0.032 
 
Year: 2003  Year: 2004 
AT 31934.990 1034216.000 51.295 137386.660  39281.880 1276778.000 75.953 177447.700 
CAPR3 14.047 28.410 7.200 3.169  14.147 57.710 8.850 5.357 
EBIT 2.179 13.648 -1.064 1.087  2.067 14.120 -2.925 1.114 
LT 0.908 0.975 0.602 0.031  0.907 0.974 0.655 0.036 
 
Year: 2005  Year: 2006 
AT 43333.720 1588784.810 82.176 206491.000  54970.860 1952307.020 116.714 260796.580 
CAPR3 14.099 50.830 10.080 5.188  14.387 48.900 10.020 5.117 
EBIT 2.141 14.906 -2.199 1.212  2.026 12.277 -1.275 1.024 
LT 0.904 0.974 0.722 0.038  0.902 0.973 0.754 0.036 
 
Year: 2007  Year: 2008 
AT 62208.830 2474411.180 119.361 305232.120  68564.900 3001251.460 45.235 348885.560 
CAPR3 14.187 58.970 9.280 5.703  14.276 49.240 8.730 5.003 
EBIT 1.824 13.565 -1.499 1.273  1.174 12.273 -8.674 1.462 
LT 0.899 0.974 0.668 0.041  0.902 0.978 0.660 0.039 
 
Year: 2009  Year: 2010 
AT 70906.700 2949092.770 47.517 341921.060  70575.420 2651355.850 49.346 334540.590 
CAPR3 14.823 45.500 3.000 4.674  15.554 41.450 1.070 4.623 
EBIT 0.982 10.380 -4.535 1.696  1.426 9.349 -8.183 1.575 
LT 0.903 0.989 0.705 0.034  0.902 0.997 0.756 0.033 
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Table 09: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Characteristics (Continued) 
Panel B: Bank Characteristics by Bank Ranking 
Year: 2001 Small   Medium    Large  Welch t-stat. 
Variable Mean Max. Min. 
Std 
Dev. Mean Max. Min. 
Std 
Dev. Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Big-
Small 
Big-
Middle 
Middle-
Small 
AT 281.30 487.20 86.48 108.42 858.75 1509.48 487.67 297.96 59457.04 695877.00 1604.13 144786.02 3.70 3.66 16.48 
CAPR3 14.98 35.70 9.40 4.80 14.32 31.00 9.78 4.23 13.57 49.90 9.20 5.06 -1.79 -1.01 -0.90 
EBIT 1.88 3.97 -2.76 0.86 2.06 3.63 -1.66 0.73 2.27 4.85 0.89 0.65 3.16 1.88 1.40 
LT 0.90 0.94 0.81 0.03 0.91 0.95 0.74 0.03 0.92 0.96 0.86 0.02 3.98 1.94 1.39 
Year: 2002 Small   Medium    Large 
AT 321.80 551.92 110.52 122.54 959.27 1743.70 553.82 323.77 80962.40 759246.00 1785.98 188621.58 3.94 3.91 16.96 
CAPR3 14.41 38.60 8.70 4.23 14.45 48.20 8.20 5.27 13.66 30.90 9.50 3.52 -1.18 -1.10 0.06 
EBIT 1.94 3.39 -0.51 0.67 2.10 4.10 -3.02 0.89 2.47 4.48 0.95 0.66 4.64 2.85 1.26 
LT 0.90 0.94 0.81 0.02 0.90 0.96 0.56 0.05 0.91 0.97 0.87 0.02 3.32 1.71 0.38 
Year: 2003 Small   Medium    Large 
AT 335.72 573.55 51.30 127.04 1020.33 1838.84 583.75 337.25 94085.69 1034216.00 1846.50 225769.05 3.87 3.84 17.71 
CAPR3 14.41 28.41 7.20 3.69 14.15 27.16 10.54 3.12 13.63 25.00 9.70 2.66 -1.46 -1.10 -0.46 
EBIT 1.93 4.61 -1.06 0.81 2.07 4.35 0.74 0.69 2.58 13.65 1.08 1.55 3.14 2.53 1.18 
LT 0.91 0.97 0.81 0.03 0.91 0.94 0.60 0.04 0.91 0.97 0.76 0.03 1.13 0.61 0.30 
Year: 2004 Small   Medium    Large 
AT 356.36 609.12 75.95 140.77 1070.37 1964.44 610.09 362.45 116418.90 1276778.00 2058.04 293492.81 3.77 3.75 17.52 
CAPR3 15.10 41.01 10.20 6.19 14.20 57.71 8.85 6.06 13.25 38.69 10.00 3.44 -2.22 -1.18 -0.88 
EBIT 1.79 3.89 -2.93 0.90 1.97 3.51 0.53 0.58 2.46 14.12 0.94 1.57 3.28 2.61 1.49 
LT 0.90 0.97 0.69 0.04 0.91 0.94 0.65 0.04 0.91 0.97 0.80 0.03 2.64 0.93 1.58 
                   
Year: 2004 Small   Medium    Large     
AT 378.38 650.25 82.18 149.57  1158.53 2081.16 660.65 416.42  128464.24 1588784.81 2107.01 343260.12  3.66 3.63 17.28 
CAPR3 15.51 42.36 10.10 6.31  13.72 50.83 10.12 5.11  13.08 39.39 10.08 3.51  -3.13 -0.95 -2.04 
EBIT 1.92 7.90 -2.20 1.09  1.99 3.74 0.54 0.63  2.52 14.91 0.44 1.66  2.80 2.75 0.54 
LT 0.90 0.94 0.72 0.05  0.91 0.95 0.76 0.03  0.91 0.97 0.73 0.04  1.93 -0.26 2.35 
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Table 09: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Characteristics (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Bank Characteristics by Bank Ranking 
Year: 2006 Small   Medium    Large  Welch t-stat. 
Variable Mean Max. Min. 
Std 
Dev. Mean Max. Min. 
Std 
Dev. Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Big-
Small 
Middle-
Small 
Big-
Middle 
AT 407.59 710.01 116.71 153.80  1219.33 2176.00 713.24 454.67  162740.03 1952307.02 2190.65 432555.53  3.75 3.73 16.90 
CAPR3 15.77 41.92 10.02 5.52  14.04 48.90 10.20 5.74  13.35 30.92 10.49 3.49  -3.64 -1.02 -2.16 
EBIT 1.83 6.13 -1.28 0.83  1.89 3.72 0.30 0.68  2.35 12.28 0.37 1.38  3.02 2.81 0.52 
LT 0.89 0.94 0.76 0.04  0.91 0.96 0.76 0.03  0.91 0.97 0.75 0.03  2.37 -0.12 2.60 
                   
Year: 2007 Small   Medium    Large 
AT 414.87 709.90 119.36 153.84  1249.76 2291.63 709.95 447.70  184961.87 2474411.18 2317.25 508400.67  3.72 3.70 18.07 
CAPR3 15.96 58.97 10.00 7.23  13.91 46.70 10.12 5.57  12.67 25.00 9.28 3.00  -4.23 -2.00 -2.27 
EBIT 1.63 13.56 -0.70 1.42  1.63 3.70 -1.50 0.71  2.24 11.35 -0.71 1.48  2.98 3.74 0.02 
LT 0.89 0.95 0.67 0.05  0.90 0.95 0.76 0.03  0.91 0.97 0.73 0.04  3.13 0.81 2.53 
                   
Year: 2008 Small   Medium    Large 
AT 431.32 756.40 45.24 168.87  1313.04 2302.68 761.01 448.24  203950.34 3001251.46 2341.50 582795.10  3.66 3.65 19.31 
CAPR3 15.26 49.24 9.20 6.51  13.86 45.02 8.73 4.86  13.69 23.00 8.88 2.72  -2.29 -0.31 -1.79 
EBIT 1.04 12.27 -3.40 1.49  0.94 2.86 -8.67 1.31  1.58 9.29 -2.21 1.52  2.53 3.20 -0.51 
LT 0.89 0.96 0.66 0.05  0.91 0.96 0.77 0.03  0.91 0.98 0.81 0.03  2.47 0.32 2.17 
                   
Year: 2009 Small   Medium    Large 
AT 450.75 765.49 47.52 178.48  1368.65 2401.20 808.97 453.55  211510.68 2949092.77 2423.97 569174.90  3.96 3.94 20.18 
CAPR3 14.82 45.50 9.23 5.47  14.62 42.04 3.00 5.11  15.04 25.60 8.10 3.03  0.38 0.75 -0.28 
EBIT 0.84 6.49 -4.26 1.30  0.77 3.42 -4.05 1.38  1.34 10.38 -4.54 2.22  2.06 2.33 -0.41 
LT 0.90 0.94 0.70 0.04  0.91 0.99 0.75 0.03  0.90 0.97 0.81 0.03  0.88 -0.51 1.31 
                   
Year: 2010 Small   Medium    Large   
AT 445.11 797.25 49.35 180.78  1377.91 2395.09 801.47 441.29  209903.22 2651355.85 2395.72 555195.85  4.17 4.15 21.60 
CAPR3 15.66 36.50 7.06 5.24  15.21 41.45 1.07 5.09  15.81 32.26 9.00 3.19  0.28 1.10 -0.68 
EBIT 1.19 5.02 -8.18 1.30  1.25 7.19 -3.07 1.32  1.79 9.35 -6.25 1.92  2.85 2.55 0.36 
LT 0.90 1.00 0.76 0.04  0.91 0.99 0.79 0.03  0.90 1.00 0.82 0.03  0.87 -1.03 1.79 
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1.7.2 Monetary Shocks and Bank Stock Returns: Evidence from Overall Sample 
This paper extends from Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) framework to analyze the 
monetary impact on bank stocks. Table 10 reports panel estimation of equation (4) as given in 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); monetary shocks and bank stock returns are daily frequency. 
Column (1) reports panel estimation for the overall sample period without differentiating the 
bank size effects. Column (1) estimates show that for the overall sample period of December 18, 
2002 to November 30, 2011. Results suggest that expected monetary shock has positive effect 
on bank stock return; however, unexpected shock component has otherwise negative impact. 
Such findings are identical to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) findings. Later, Column (2), (3) and 
(4) report panel estimation of equation (5) that considers smaller banks as base case and include 
medium size banks and large size banks as “medium” and “large” dummies respectively. Finally, 
column (5) includes both medium size and large size banks. Results from column (2) and (3) 
suggest that none of the monetary shock components has any significant impact on either the 
small size banks or the medium banks. Once large size banks are included, coefficient estimates 
suggest that both expected and unexpected components of monetary shocks have significant 
impact on stocks of large banks. To summarize, regression estimates from table 10 suggest that 
the significant monetary impact on overall sample may be contributed by significant impact 
that monetary shocks have over the large banks. 
 
1.7.2 Bank Size and Monetary Shocks during Pre-QE and QE regime 
Earlier, section six provides the supporting evidence of the differential impact of 
monetary shocks under QE regime and otherwise conventional monetary regimes. Hypothesis 
III of this paper aims at analyzing the same at bank stock level. Table 11 reports the panel 
estimates for equation (6). Overall Sample period is December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011. 
“PreQE” dummy is used for pre-QE period from December 18, 2002 to December 24, 2008, and 
“QE” dummy is used for QE period from December 31, 2008 to November 30, 2011. Weekly 
data is used as change in Federal Reserve’s asset holding in special programs is only available 
at weekly frequency. 
Column (1) reports the panel estimations for overall sample; column (2), (3) and (4) 
present the results for the “small”, the “medium” and the “large” ranked banks separately to 
analyze the impact of bank size effect. Results from column (1) suggest that during both 
conventional and QE regime, monetary shocks are not significant in explaining weekly stock 
returns; however change in FED’s total asset holding in special programs is significant during 
the QE regime. Results from column (2), (3) and (4) commend for some explanations as well. 
Implications of monetary shocks for the “large” size banks are in general similar for the overall 
sample. Such patters may be consistent with the fact that FEDs asset purchase windows aim at 
purchasing a diversified range of assets and larger banks are more likely to be the recipients of 
such benefits. However, as the bank size decreases, monetary shocks have more explanatory 
power. The “medium” size banks exhibit responsiveness to monetary shocks during QE period; 
the “small” bank stocks are responsive to monetary shocks in both QE and pre-QE periods.  
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Table 10 
Bank Size and Monetary Shocks: Overall Sample 
 
Table 10 presents panel estimations of the equation (4) and (5):   
 
  =        
  
     
  ̃ (4) 
  =        
  
     
 (5) 
                     
  
       
  ̃      
where EXSH and UNEXSH are expected and unexpected monetary shocks, respectively. Column (1) reports 
coefficient estimates for overall sample. For equation (5), small bank sample is held as base case and estimates are 
reported in column (2); later medium-size banks and large-size banks are included by introducing “medium” and 
“large” dummies and reported in column (3) and column(4). Finally, in column (4), both “medium” and “large” 
dummies are added to the base case of small bank sample. All data are daily; sample period is from December 18, 
2002 to November 30, 2011. For each estimate, first row is the coefficient estimate that is followed by t-statistics 
presented within parenthesis. a, b and c are statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Col (1) Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) Col(5) 
  Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. Co-eff. 
C -0.0626 0.1098 0.2776 -1.2183 -1.8587 
(-0.106) (0.187) (0.348) (-1.3299) (-1.382) 
      
EXSH 0.2270 c 0.0599 0.0606 0.0577 0.0555 
(3.524) (0.533) (0.539) (0.5141) (0.494) 
      
UNEXSH -0.2592 c 0.1089 0.1097 0.1069 0.1048 
(-4.218) (1.016) (1.023) (0.9978) (0.977) 
      
Medium --- -0.5771 --- 1.1065 
(-0.357) (0.606) 
      
Medium *EXSH --- 0.0187 --- 0.0184 
(0.167) (0.1653) 
      
Medium *UNEXSH --- -0.0583 --- -0.0579 
(-0.547) (-0.544) 
      
Large --- --- 3.4390 a 4.1495 a 
(1.659) (1.771) 
      
Large *EXSH --- --- 0.5998 c 0.5997 c 
(5.411) (5.410) 
      
Large *UNEXSH --- --- -0.8122 c -0.8122 c 
        (-7.674) (-7.674) 
R-sq. 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0058 0.0058 
Cross Section FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cross Section 186 62 124 124 186 
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Table 11 
Bank Size and Monetary Shocks during Pre-QE and QE regime 
 
Table 11 presents panel estimation of the equation (6):  
 
  =   
  
     
     !"##$
   %  (6) 
        %  
  
   %    
 %      !"##$
  ̃      
 
Column (1) reports coefficient estimates for overall sample; column (2), (3) and (4) present coefficient estimates of 
equation (6) for small, medium and large banks separately. Weekly data is used as change in Federal Reserve’s 
asset holding in special programs is a only available at weekly frequency. Overall Sample period is 
December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011. “PreQE” dummy is used for pre-QE period from December 18, 2002 to 
December 24, 2008, and “QE” dummy is used for QE period from December 31, 2008 to November 30, 2011. For 
each estimate, first row is the coefficient estimate that is followed by t-statistics presented within parenthesis. a, b 
and c are statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Col (1)  Col (2)  Col (3)  Col (4)   
  Overall   Small   Medium   Large   
 Co-eff.   Co-eff.   Co-eff.   Co-eff.  
C 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0018 
(0.031) (0.369) (-0.079) (-0.270) 
         
EXSH 0.0003 0.0003 c  0.0023 0.0005 
(0.117) (5.004)  (0.324) (0.864) 
         
UEXSH 0.0001 -0.0003 c  -0.0001 -0.0007 
(0.040) (-3.836)  (-0.017) (-1.070) 
         
ChangeTOT -0.0048 0.0153 c  -0.0021 0.0085 
(-0.023) (3.889)  (-0.003) (0.190) 
   
 
     
QEE 0.0127 0.0032 c  0.5921 c  0.0028 
(0.182) (2.808)  (2.522)  (0.190) 
     
 
   
QEE*EXSH -0.0111 -0.0015 b  -0.3805 c  0.0098 
(-0.242) (-1.841)  (-2.522)  (1.014) 
   
 
 
 
   
QEE*UEXSH 0.0201 0.0076 c  0.3919 c  0.0003 
(0.551)  (12.264)  (3.131)  (0.035) 
   
 
 
 
   
QEE*ChangeTOT -4.9067 c  -1.3987 c  -73.0919 c  -1.0540 c  
(-17.306) (-23.893)  (-8.513)  (-17.594) 
         
R-sq. 0.0696   0.8656   0.5120   0.0710   
Cross Section FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Period FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cross Section 186  62  62  62  
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Table 12 
Bank Size, Monetary Shocks and Asset Purchase Programs 
 
Table 12 presents panel estimation of the equation (7):  
 
  =   		   
  
     
   &,, ($)**+,   ̃ (7) 
 
Column (1) reports coefficient estimates for overall sample; later column (2), (3) and (4) present coefficient 
estimates of equation (7) for small, medium and large banks respectively. All data are daily. For each estimate, first 
row is the coefficient estimate that is followed by t-statistics presented within parenthesis. a, b and c are statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Col (1)  Col (2)  Col (3)  Col (4)  
    Overall  Small  Middle  Big  
  Co-eff.   Co-eff.   Co-eff.   Co-eff.   
C -0.7503 -0.3767 -0.1294 -0.2597 
(-1.266) (-1.100) (-0.371) (-0.799) 
          
EXSH 0.1968c 0.0824 -0.0180 0.5099 c  
(2.995) (1.232) (-0.266) (8.149)  
          
UNEXSH -0.2954 c 0.0109 -0.0749 -0.8016 c  
(-4.550) (0.165) (-1.123) (-12.969)  
  
 
     
 
 
1 UNEXSH*OpenTAF 22.7851 a 30.6835 b  -2.3575 35.7171 c  
(1.775) (2.356)  (-0.178) (2.917)  
          
2 UNEXSH*OpenTSLF 2.4958 c 1.0783  1.8692 b  4.6340 c  
(3.080) (1.301)  (2.257)  (6.004)  
          
4 UNEXSH*OpenAMLF -8.4219 c -2.8320 c  -6.9370 c  -15.5309 c  
(-15.251) (-5.037)  (-12.234)  (-29.518)  
          
5 UNEXSH*OpenCPFF 1.7838 c 1.2694 c  1.4716 c  2.5162 c  
(10.712) (7.534)  (8.587)  (15.821)  
          
6 UNEXSH*OpenMMIFF -5.5588 c -0.4767  -4.8256 c  -11.3329 c  
(-10.204) (-0.863)  (-8.626)  (-21.734)  
          
7 UNEXSH*OpenTALF -3.3883 -22.2092 c  1.1426  11.9951  
(-0.477) (-3.111) (0.156)  (1.754)  
    
 
     
8,9,10 UNEXSH*CloseAMLF 13.9152 -6.6837 24.8365 c  22.9665 c  
(1.558) (-0.735) (2.696) (2.6986)  
          
11 UNEXSH*CloseTAF 13.1253 -1.4205 26.4193 14.2109  
(0.802) (-0.085) (1.564) (0.910)  
          
12 UNEXSH*CloseTSLF 4.7695 -0.5716 0.7764 12.7814 c  
    (1.509)   (-0.178)   (0.237)   (4.250)   
R-sq. 0.0065 0.0059 0.0060 0.0089 
Cross Section FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Cross Sections 186    62    62        
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1.7.3 Bank Size, Monetary Shocks and Asset Purchase Programs 
We extend from Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) to analyze the set of Asset purchase 
programs initiated by the FED following the 2008 global financial crisis; equation (7) includes 
event dummies for the opening and closing dates of the asset purchase windows. Column (1) in 
Table 12 reports the panel estimation of equation (7) for the overall sample; later column (2), 
(3) and (4) present estimates for small size banks, medium size banks and large size banks 
respectively.  
Among the opening events, opening of Term Auction Facility (TAF) on December 12, 
2007 has positive stock reaction from large and small banks and for the overall sample as well. 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) is a window where FED would auction term funds to depository 
institutions; all depository institutions that are eligible to borrow. Similarly, there is a positive 
stock reaction for the opening of Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF) window. On March 
11, 2008, The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the TSLF that would lend up 
to $200 billion of Treasury securities for 28-day terms against federal agency debt, federal 
agency residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS), non-agency AAA/Aaa private label 
residential MBS, and other securities. Later, opening of Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) on October 7, 2008 also exhibit positive stock reaction for all types of banks; creation of 
CPFF was intended to provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper through 
a special purpose vehicle that will purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed 
commercial paper directly from eligible issuers. 
For two other opening windows, the bank stock reactions are otherwise negative. On 
September 19, 2008, FED discloses the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) to extend non-recourse loans at the primary 
credit rate to U.S. depository institutions and bank holding companies to finance their purchase 
of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds. On October 
21, 2008, FED Board discloses creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIFF) that aims at senior secured funding to a series of special purpose vehicles to facilitate 
the purchase of assets from eligible primary dealers. 
For the other opening window event, there is no robust stock reaction in the selected 
bank sample; on March 3, 2009, FED announces the creation of the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Lending Facility (TALF) to lend up to $200 billion on a non-recourse basis to 
holders of AAA-rated asset-backed securities. Findings on bank stock reaction on the different 
asset purchase window opening events can be better summarized as inconclusive. However, 
bank stock reaction on closure of asset purchase windows are rather easy to summarize. 
Closures of asset purchase windows have positive stock reaction from large banks and medium 
size banks for CPFF, MMIFF AMFLF windows. For closure of TSLF, there is positive and 
significant reaction from only large banks. Among the closure of six asset purchase windows, 
there is no significant stock reaction on the closure of TAF window from any type of banks. 
 
1.8 Summary Findings 
This paper analyzes the impact of FED’s monetary policy actions following the 2008 
global financial crisis with specific focus on the Quantitative Easing policy during the zero-
bound interest rate regime. Following Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we calculate the expected 
and unexpected monetary shocks. Summary statistics suggests that both expected and 
unexpected shocks are significantly different in terms of their means and variances during pre-
QE and QE regime; besides this, the means and their variances of all conventional and 
unconventional monetary tools are generally different during pre-QE and QE regime which is 
consistent with the regime change argument in monetary shocks and monetary policy tools in a 
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QE monetary regime. Granger causality analysis exhibits some key causality patterns. Out of 
three conventional policy tools, only M1 have significant causality relationship over TOT 
during all the three regimes, while TOT has significant causality over all conventional during 
QE period only. Causality within expected and unexpected monetary shocks are more 
pronounced and robust during QE regime, and during the QE regime, monetary shocks work 
as efficient transmission channels for monetary policy only for bond spreads and have no 
significant causality over market indexes. Monetary shocks do have causality effect on 
commercial papers, for both financial and non-financial and for different maturities, but only 
during the QE regime. 
Both expected and unexpected shocks have statistically and economically significant 
effects on DJIA and SNP500 returns in all three sample periods but their economic magnitudes 
during pre-QE and overall period are much lower. For example, 1% change in previous period 
expected shock is likely to impart 1.77 basis changes in DJIA and 1.85 basis changes in SNP500 
return during overall period; and the impact is similar during pre-QE sample. During all three 
sample periods, monetary shocks have no significant impact on changes in trade-weighted 
exchange index. However, for VIX, expected monetary shocks are significant in all three 
samples but unexpected shocks are rather significant in only QE sample period at their 
previous periods. Among all the monetary policy tools both conventional and unconventional, 
only % changes in Federal Reserve’s Total Asset held under Special programs in their previous 
period and previous second period are statistically significant in explaining DJIA and SNP500 
returns, during the overall period. But, during pre-QE and overall sample period, impact of 
percentage changes of special asset holding is not robust and in some cases, other monetary 
tools are also significant. 
We also analyze the impact of monetary actions at bank stock level to complement our 
prior analysis of monetary impact on aggregate level. We use a set of 186 banks that discloses 
financial information on COMPUSTAT Bank Annual database and have stock return data on 
CRSP database. Banks are sorted by their asset sizes and divided into three classes: “small”, 
“medium” and “large” represented by lowest 33%, middle 34% and highest 33% ranks of the 
sample sorted by the total bank assets for each year. Results suggest that, in general, banks 
with larger asset size tend to have higher EBIT; however, for CAPR and LT variables, there is 
no much difference among the “large”, “medium” and “small” ranked banks. We extend the 
analysis of monetary actions on bank stock return in three different ways. 
First, we analyze the impact of monetary shocks without differentiating the monetary 
regimes for the overall sample period of December 18, 2002 to November 30, 2011. Results 
suggest that, in general, expected monetary shock has positive effect on bank stock return; 
however, unexpected shock component has otherwise negative impact. Such findings are 
identical to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) findings. However, for “small” and “medium” size 
banks, such findings are not as robust as evident for “large” banks. 
Second, we investigate impact of monetary shocks and change in FED’s total asset 
holding in special asset purchase window during the pre-QE and QE regimes for the overall 
bank sample as well as for the three bank sub-samples, both individually and collectively. 
Results suggest that during both conventional and QE regime, monetary shocks are not 
significant in explaining weekly stock returns; however change in FED’s total asset holding in 
special programs is significant during the QE regime and such findings are more robust for the 
“large” banks when compared to “medium” and “small” banks. However, as the bank size 
decreases, monetary shocks have more explanatory power. “Middle” size banks exhibit 
responsiveness to monetary shocks during QE period; “small” bank stocks are responsive to 
monetary shocks in both QE and pre-QE periods. 
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Finally, we analyze whether any abnormal return exists for the announcement events of 
opening and closure of different the asset purchase windows by the FED. For the opening 
events, out of six asset purchase windows, we find three events have positive stock response in 
the bank sample. For example: the opening of Term Auction Facility (TAF) on December 12, 
2007, Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF) window on March 11, 2008 and Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) on October 7, 2008, have positive response. However, two 
other window opening events of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) on September 19, 2008 and the Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility (MMIFF) On October 21, 2008, have rather negative response. Findings on 
bank stock reaction on the different asset purchase window opening events can be better 
summarized as inconclusive. However, bank stock reaction on closure of asset purchase 
windows are rather easy to summarize; the closures of asset purchase windows have positive 
stock reaction from large banks and medium size banks for CPFF, MMIFF AMFLF windows. 
For closure of TSLF, there is positive and significant reaction from only large banks. 
To summarize, the results are, in general, consistent with Bernanke (2004) argument 
that even during a zero-bound interest rate regime; FED may still affect target variables 
through managing its asset-side components at aggregate level. At bank stock level, we find 
the response to opening of assets purchase programs are rather mixed; however, the closure 
information of asset purchase programs are generally perceived as good signal. Besides, there 
are significant variations among bank stock response once bank sizes are considered; large 
banks stocks are generally more responsive as they are recipients of greater benefits of asset 
purchase programs. 
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2. Chapter 02: Prudential Regulatory Regimes, Accounting Standards and 
Loan Loss Provision in Banking Industry 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Prudential regulations and accounting standards provide specific guidelines for loan loss 
accounting in the banking industry; the bank managers are required to keep provisions from 
the earning to cover up expected loan losses based on a certain loan quality matrix given by the 
regulators. Current literature in bank earning management and accounting documents that 
bank managers often use their discretion in loan loss provisioning (hereafter cited as LLP); 
extant studies provide three major explanations: income smoothing, capital management, and 
signaling. However, the empirical evidences in bank earning management in terms of LLP can 
be best summarized as inconclusive as documented in Wahlen  (1994), Ahmed et al (1999), 
Anandarajan et al (2003), Bouvatier and Lepetit  (2006), and more recently Das and Ghosh 
(2007). 
While the impact of managerial discretion in LLP still remains debatable, a recent set of 
literature, for example: Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Pérez, Fumás, and Saurina (2006), 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2010), and Égert and Sutherland (2012), looks into the implications of 
prudential regulations over bank earning management. Prudential regulations are important 
for banking industry for two explicit reasons. First, as banks and financial institutions are 
highly leveraged and deal with depositors investments, the banking industry is subjected to 
higher regulatory oversights. So, prudential regulations are often aimed at bringing in better 
industry disciplines. Second, the probability of loan delinquencies is correlated with macro-
economic cycles or business cycles that eventually lead bank managers keeping aside higher 
amount of loan loss provision during the downturn. The latter phenomenon is often cited as the 
“pro-cyclicality of loan loss provisioning” that can be eventually counter-effective during the 
times of credit crunch and thus undermine monetary authorities’ initiatives to add additional 
liquidity in the credit channel. Risk-based capital adequacy requirements fostered by Basel I 
and subsequently Basel II standards imparts pro-cyclicality components in loan loss 
provisioning and capital requirements (see: Kero (2011) for more on Basel I and II regulations). 
Although the regulators and researchers begin focusing on the challenges of pro-
cyclicality in prudential regulations since 2000, this issue has gained much more importance 
right after the financial crisis of 2007. Regulators in Spain are the first to initiate the concept 
dynamic provisioning in 2000 as an alternative regulatory framework that requires bank 
managers’ to set aside LLP using a formula that estimates provisions through forward looking 
forecasts. Following the dynamic prudential framework of Spain, regulators in other countries, 
like: Chile, Colombia and Peru initiates similar approach in 2003, 2007 and 2009 respectively 
with some variations to adjust for country-specific customizations. As dynamic provisioning 
regime is still an evolving prudential framework, a trend of recent literature focuses on single 
country simulation studies, for example: Burroni et al (2009), Torsten Wezel (2010), and Lau 
(2011). A few multi-country studies provide rather empiric analyses because of data availability 
(Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Pérez et al (2006), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2010) and Égert 
and Sutherland (2012)). More recently, a trend of studies also focuses on plausible impact of 
dynamic provisions if implemented on United States that are largely based on simulation 
analysis (see: Fillat and Garriga (2010)). 
Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) paper is closely related to this study; using a panel 
database of 3221 bank-year observations from 40 countries, Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) 
identify that income smoothing of loan loss provision depends on investor protection, 
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disclosure, regulation and supervision, financial structure, and financial development, after 
controlling for country GDP growth, year fixed effect and bank specific variables. 
In line with this emerging trend of studies, this paper is motivated to analyze how a 
change in prudential regulatory regimes may affect LLP. We differ from the extant studies in 
one important way that we analyze the change in prudential regime change in cross country set 
up that includes countries with both pro-cyclic and dynamic regimes. Besides, core to the 
motivation of this study, we also analyze if change in accounting standards impart any impact 
on bank earning management. As US GAAP, UK GAAP, and IFRS and other prevailing 
accounting standards are converging to a more principle-based accounting standard by the end 
of 2015, analyzing the impact of different accounting standards may provide different insight to 
the bank earning management literature. Existing accounting literature shows that the 
migration from a rule-based to a principal-based accounting standard has otherwise reduced 
managerial discretion in earning managements in non-financial firms during the mandatory 
migration of accounting standards of 2004-2005 for EU countries (Capkun et al (2010)). To our 
best knowledge, this study is one of the few studies to explicitly analyze impact of similar 
migration of accounting standards in banking industry. 
Two reasons, intertwined with each other, commend for a global perspective of analysis 
on bank earning management in terms of LLP. First, changes in prudential regulations or 
moving from one accounting standard to another accounting standard involve significant 
change in regulatory regimes and, for any given country, such events are rather infrequent. To 
analyze how such changes may affect, we use a larger cross section of countries to bring in 
more information to analyze the phenomenon empirically. Second, as we control for country 
effects in a cross-country approach, it allows us to provide a bigger picture on how changes in 
accounting standards and prudential regulatory regimes may affect LLP in general. While 
existing studies on the bank earning literature provide a few cross-country analyses, we argue 
the latter reason makes contribution of this paper worthy to extant literature. 
Consistent with the core arguments, we analyze three explicit questions: Whether a 
change in regulatory stance in terms of loan loss provisioning, from a pro-cyclical regime to a 
dynamic regime, can affect bank earning management via LLP? Whether changes in 
accounting standards affect managerial discretion over managing earnings in banking sector? 
What is the joint effect of changes in accounting standards and changes in regulatory regimes? 
Accordingly, we expect this study to contribute to the extant bank earning management 
literature in three different ways. First, core to the arguments in earning management 
literatures, this is one of the few early studies to analyze how these two competing loan 
provisioning regulatory framework may affect managerial discretion in LLP. Second, instead of 
country specific analysis, this study provides a cross-country analysis that allows us to draw 
information from additional cross-sections. Third, to our best knowledge, this study is one of 
the early studies to analyze the implications of the provision regulations following the 2007 
financial crisis with a reasonably large global dataset. Our dataset covers a time period of 12 
years from 1999 to 2010 that provides us with reasonably large and recent information as 
compared to extant studies that generally use dataset ending at 2004. 
The remainder of the study is organized as following. Section two provides a brief 
overview of extant literature. Later, section three presents the core research questions and 
related hypotheses in the methodology section; next section three provides a brief description 
of data and plausible econometric techniques to analyze the research questions. Section four 
presents the descriptive statistics and section five discusses the regression analysis. Finally, 
section six, summarizes the key findings. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
Three sets of literature on financial institutions and accounting standards are relevant 
to this study. The first set focuses on definitions of loan loss provisions and their implications 
as core to the bank earning management arguments. The second set summarizes the key 
arguments in dynamic provisioning and pro-cyclical provisioning and related empiric 
evidences. The third set is related with accounting standards and implications of changes in 
accounting standards on earnings management, in general. 
 
2.2.1 Loan Loss Provisioning and Bank Earnings Management  
Extant literature on bank earning management, generally, provides three major 
explanations: a) income smoothing, b) capital management, and c) signaling hypothesis. First, 
Income smoothing hypothesis argues that bank managers tend to set aside loan loss provisions 
during good times so that they can use them as buffer during downward business cycle to cover 
higher loan delinquencies. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Wahlen (1994) and Beaver and Engel 
(1996), among others, provide supporting evidence that LLP has positive relation with earning 
before tax and provision. However, Beatty et al (1995), Ahmed et al (1999), among others, 
provide otherwise contrasting evidence. 
Second, capital management hypothesis argues that bank managers use LLP as a buffer 
to the bank capital requirement and when faced with minimum capital requirement tends to use 
LLP to cover for the capital shortfall. Kim and Kross (1998), Ahmed et al (1999), Cortavarria et 
al (2000), and Das and Ghosh (2007), among others, document a negative relationship between 
loan loss provision and bank capital supporting the capital management argument. Third, 
signaling hypothesis argues that managers can use higher loan loss provisioning as a proxy for 
financial strength and accordingly LLP is positively related with the change in earnings. 
Although, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2006) provide supporting evidence for signaling arguments 
using banking data of France, UK, Germany and Italy, Anandarajan et al (2003) documents 
otherwise contradictory evidences for a Spanish sample.   
More recently, a set of studies focuses on multi-country comparisons in managerial 
discretion in Loan Loss reporting. Leuz et al (2003) is one of the earlier studies to analyze the 
existence of earning management in a global setting in non-financial firms. Later, using a 
Bankscope dataset for a sample period of 1993 to 1999, Chih and Shen (2005) analyze the 
earning management phenomenon in banking industry in US and 47 other countries. Using 
three alternate measures and regression technique controlling for per capita GDP, legal 
framework, disclosure index from LLSV(1994), and country and year fixed effects, Chih and 
Shen (2005) document that earnings management is rather a global phenomenon. 
 
2.2.2  Prudential regulatory regimes: pro-cyclic and dynamic provisioning 
Prudential regulations set by the regulators provide explicit guidelines about how bank 
managers need to classify their loan portfolios, and accordingly set aside a segment of their 
earnings based on the probability of loan delinquency and risk weighted matrix in terms of 
Loan Loss Provisions. Loan loss provisions are intended to be the first frontier of buffers that 
bank managers are required to set aside and required minimum threshold of capital is the 
ultimate buffer that is supposed to provide cushion if loan delinquency increases. Extant studies 
on prudential regulations document that the nature of Basel I and II capital adequacy 
requirements and the underlying benchmark risk matrices are the reasons of pro-cyclicality in 
loan loss provisioning. Although pro-cyclicality of loan loss provisioning is well-documented as 
early as Bikker and Metzemakers(2005); the global financial crisis of 2007 provides additional 
impetus in prudential regulation literature. 
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Using a banking sample of OECD member countries, United States of America, 
European Union countries, Japan, France and Italy over a period of 1991-2001, Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2005) document that loan loss provisioning is generally pro-cyclic and bank 
managers, others than from Spain and United Kingdom, engage in income smoothing. Later, 
using a dataset of banks from European Union countries over 1992 to 2004 in a panel data 
analysis, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) show that pro-cyclicality still persists and managers 
engage in income smoothing. Their sample excludes 2004-2005 transition period of mandatory 
migration of accounting standard for firms as required by EU regulators. 
Following the 2007 financial crisis, a recent trend of literature provides survey of 
prudential regulations, policy recommendations and simulations of dynamic provision, if 
implemented, in different geographic location (see: Aliaga-Diaz et al (2011), Haocong Ren 
(2011), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2010)). In a recent study, Égert and Sutherland (2012) provide 
empirical evidence in favor of pro-cyclicality of loan loss provisioning by using a dataset of 
banks from OECD countries. Égert and Sutherland (2012) also document that dynamic 
provisioning may reduce the risk of pro-cyclicality imparted into loan loss provisioning and 
may be preferred over the existing Basel I and II pro-cyclic requirements. To summarize, the 
debate over pro-cyclical and dynamic loan provisioning still remains an open agenda in the 
extant prudential regulations literature. 
 
2.2.3  Accounting standards and earnings management 
Changes in accounting standards and plausible implication in earnings management is a 
well-researched phenomenon in accounting literature. Earlier accounting literature rather 
documents the limited abilities of regulatory changes on discouraging or encouraging earnings 
management (see: Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a survey). Some later studies, like: Hung and 
Subramanyam (2004) and Bartov et al. (2004), among others, however, document that changes 
in accounting standards may add value to accounting information, specially, in the developed 
economy. Following the ‘Norwalk’ agreement between the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) signed to create more 
principles-based accounting standards for global financial reporting by the end of 2015, a 
recent surge of accounting literature focus on plausible implication of convergence of 
accounting standard convergence. 
More recently, Beest (2009) analyzes the effects of discretion in accounting standards on 
both the level and nature of earnings management by representing manipulations of IAS 32 and 
IAS 36 as proxies for the rules based and the principles-based setting. Empirical results show 
that both the rules-based and principles-based treatments lead to comparable levels of earnings 
management. Such findings are consistent with argument that changing discretion in 
accounting standards can affect the nature of earnings management. However, Beest (2009) 
also document that probability of earnings management through transaction decisions is higher 
in a rules-based setting rather than in a principles-based setting. 
In a contemporaneous study, Ganguli et. al. (2009) analyze whether changes in 
accounting standards add values to accounting information in an emerging and transitional 
economy like: China. Comparing the characteristics of accounting data of IAS-adopting firms 
with the same of non-adopting firms, they conclude that adopting firms are less likely to 
smooth earnings in the post-adoption period. They analyze three core hypotheses. First, firms 
adopting IAS are less likely to smooth earnings compared to their counterparts adhering to 
local GAAP. Second, IAS-adopting firms are less likely to manage earnings upwards than their 
local GAAP counterparts. And finally, firms adopting IAS are more likely to recognize loss in a 
timely manner than firms adopting local GAAP. Using a sample of 913 firms listed in the 
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Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1994 to 2000, from the 
Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, Ganguli et. al. (2009) finds empiric evidence 
supporting their arguments. 
Capkun et al (2010) analyzes the use of flexibility of IFRS by 1,635 European Union 
firms during 2004-2005 mandatory transition from Local GAAPs to IFRS. They find evidence 
supporting three hypotheses: a) current earning management hypothesis, b) Income Smoothing 
hypothesis; and c) setting the bar hypothesis. Current earning management hypothesis argues 
that, on average, Local GAAP firms with negative earnings are more likely to show positive 
earnings reconciliations than Local GAAP firms with positive earnings. Income Smoothing 
argument hypothesize that, given the distribution of Local GAAP firms with positive earnings, 
better performing firms are likely to have a higher probability of reporting negative Local 
GAAP-to-IFRS reconciliations than their other counterparts. Setting the bar explanation 
augments the income smoothing explanation and hypothesize that, higher probability of 
earnings managed upward in a given period is related to otherwise lower probability of beating 
such earnings in the subsequent periods. 
To summarize, recent evidences in extant accounting literature are supportive of the 
arguments that rule-based accounting standards, in general, allow more managerial discretion 
in managing earnings as compared to principle-based accounting standards for both developed 
and transitional or emerging economies. 
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Hypothesis development 
Three major hypotheses are often cited in bank earning management and loan loss 
provisioning literature: Income smoothing hypothesis, capital management hypothesis, and 
signaling hypothesis. Consistent with core arguments, this study analyzes whether and how 
these three explanations of LLP are affected by the changes in prudential regulatory regimes 
and accounting standards individually and jointly. 
 
Hypothesis I: Prudential Regulatory Regimes and Loan Loss Provision 
Extant literature suggests that, the nature of prudential regulatory regimes, whether a 
pro-cyclical or dynamic one, theoretically may impart different impacts on bank earning 
management in terms of LLP. Consistent with this argument, our first hypothesis analyzes if 
there is any significant change in LLP explanations during two different prudential regimes. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis I: Income smoothing, Capital Management and Signaling interpretations of 
LLP are systematically different in two different prudential regulatory 
regimes (i.e. pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical regime) controlling for bank 
specific factors, country specific factors and year fixed effects. 
 
Hypothesis II: Difference in Accounting Standards and Loan Loss Provision 
Extant literature on accounting standard and earnings management document that 
migration from rule-based to principal-based accounting standards can affect managerial 
discretion in managing earnings in non-financial firms. We extend from this evidence in non-
financial firms for banks and argue that difference in accounting standards, being a rule-based 
or a principal-based, may affect bank earning managements in terms of LLP. Accordingly, our 
second hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis II: Difference in accounting standards, being a rule-based or a principal-
based, affects bank earning management in terms of LLP, after 
controlling for bank specific factors, country specific factors and year 
fixed effects 
 
Hypothesis III: Joint effect of changes in Prudential Regimes and changes in Accounting Standards
 Accounting standards are converging towards a more principal based eventuality as 
countries using local GAAP are migrating to principle based IFRS standards. For some 
countries, banking industry may have to go through both changes jointly. Thus, our third 
hypothesis evolves from a combination of the first two hypotheses such that we analyze the 
joint effect of changes in prudential regulatory regime and changes in accounting standards. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis III: Changes in prudential regimes and changes in accounting standards 
jointly affect bank earning management in terms of LLP, after controlling 
for bank specific factors, country specific factors and year fixed effects. 
 
2.3.2 Empiric specification and variable definitions 
2.3.2.1 Country specific and Bank specific Control Variables 
Empiric studies analyzing bank earning management with multi-country dataset, 
generally, control for country specific variables, GDP, per capita GDP, growth of per capita 
GDP, and inflation rate to capture country specific business cycles (see: ). Following the 
seminal research by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997 JF, 1998 JPE, and 
1999 JL), hereafter cited as LLSV; and Shleifer et al (JFE, 2007), recent multi-country studies 
also include country legal framework, level of investor protection, financial development and 
others aspects into the analysis (see: Fonseca et al (JBF, 2008) among others). Bank asset size 
and net income are two frequently cited control variables used in the bank earning 
management literature. We include both bank specific control variables and country specific 
control variables in our analysis. Besides, in all through our analysis, we include year fixed 
affect and country dummies. Table 01 provides a brief summary of variable description and 
their sources. 
 
2.3.2.2 Empiric Specification 
Hypothesis I 
The following Equation (1) represents the generic form of empiric specification most 
frequently cited in the extant bank earning literature (see: Ahmed et al. (1999), Wahlen, J. 
(1994), and more recently Ghosh (2007) among others). Equation (1) holds Loan Loss 
Provision (LLP) as the dependent variable:  
,,-, . &  &/ ,,-,01/2   & 3-,   &4",01/2   &5 ∆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Bank managers are required to classify delinquent loans in different categories and set 
aside provision based on the level of default risk before they can classify and write-off a loan as 
bad and loss. So, because of the nature of prudential regulations and the risk matrix, LLP are 
generally auto-correlated and accordingly Lags of LLP are included as explanatory variable.  
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Table 13 
Variable Description and Data source  
 
 Variable Name Variable Description Source Expected 
Signs 
1. Dependent Variable:   
 LLP Ratio of Loan Loss Provision over lag total assets Bank Scope  
2. Bank Characteristics variables   
 LLP (-1) & (-2) Lags of the dependent variable ” + ve 
 CRAR Required Tier I capital ” - ve for capital 
management 
 OProfit Operating profit over lag total assets ” + ve for 
income 
smoothing 
 ∆EBTP change in Earning Before Tax and Provisioning 
over lag total assets 
” + ve for 
signalling 
3. Prudential Regulation Variable   
 DynamicDummy is 1 if country is implementing Dynamic provision  Opposite/ not 
significant  and Interaction of DynamicDummy with interest variables  
     
4. Accounting Standard Variable   
 PrincipleDummy is 1 if a bank uses a principle based accounting 
standard, zero otherwise 
 Opposite/ not 
significant 
 and Interaction of PrincipleDummy with interest variables  
Country Specific Control Variables 
A. Macro Control variables   
 GDPGR real growth in per capita GDP IMF  
 GDP real GDP in billion dollar IMF  
 Inflation  IMF  
B. Regulatory control variables   
 DISCLOSURE accounting disclosure index La Porta et al. (1998)  
 RESTRICT measure of regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities 
Barth et al. (2001)  
 OFFICIAL measures the power of official bank supervision ”  
 MONITOR an index of private bank monitoring ”  
 STRUCT measures market-orientation of the financial 
system 
”  
C. Legal control variables   
 LEGAL measure of legal enforcement La Porta et al. (1998)  
 ANTIDIRECTO
R 
measure of protection of minority shareholders ”  
 CREDITOR measures creditor rights ”  
 LegalDummy a set of five dummies capturing five country legal 
origin, as alternate to LEGAL index 
”  
La Porta et al. (1998) and Barth et al. (2001) provide points in time estimates of the variables that are generally constant 
over time. However, La Porta et al (2008) provides an update on La Porta et al (1998) indices. 
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Operating Profit is expected to have positive sign for the income smoothing explanations to 
hold. Tire-II Capital Requirement (CRAR) is included and is expected to have a negative to 
justify the capital management explanation. Change in Earning before tax and provision is 
expected to be positive if bank managers implicitly use LLP as a signal of future earnings. 
 
Hypothesis II 
We extend from the generic empiric set up as shown Equation (1) to test the three 
hypotheses core to our analysis. Hypothesis I argues that in different prudential regulatory 
regimes, i.e. pro-cyclic and dynamic regimes, managerial discretion over LLP varies. 
Accordingly, we consider pro-cyclic prudential regime as the base case and introduce a dynamic 
prudential regulation dummy (“DynDum”) and interact with the lag of LLP, and the three 
variables of interests, i.e. Operating Profit (OP), Tier I capital requirement (CRAR). Theory 
suggests that dynamic provisioning may have differential impact on managerial discretion and 
earning management explanations. 
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Hypothesis II argues that, for different types accounting standards, i.e. a rule based or a 
principal based accounting standards, managerial discretion in terms of LLP may vary. As 
accounting standards are generally converging to a principal based approach, we use rule-based 
accounting as base case and include principal based accounting standard as a dummy in a 
similar set up as given by equation (2). In Equation (3), we provide the specification where we 
interact the PrincipleDummy with the lag of LLP, and the three variables of interests, i.e. 
Operating Profit (OP), Tier I capital requirement (CRAR). Empirical evidences suggest that 
principal based accounting standards provide fewer opportunities for earnings management. 
Accordingly, we expect, otherwise a different implications of the three major explanations of 
loan loss provisioning during a principle based accounting standard. 
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Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III analyzes the combined effect of changes in prudential regulatory regimes 
and accounting standards on managerial discretion over LLP. In Equation (2) and (3), we do 
not include principle based accounting dummy and dynamic prudential regulation dummy, 
respectively. To analyze the combined effect, we use two alternate specifications. In the first 
specification, as in Equation (2) where we analyze impact of prudential regulation, we include 
accounting dummy as fixed effect. In the second and alternate specification, as in Equation (3) 
where we analyze the impact of accounting standard, we include a prudential regulation 
dummy as fixed effect. 
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Given that the rank conditions being fulfilled, we may also analyze a more robust 
specification where we assume a pro-cyclic prudential set up with a rule-based accounting 
standard (for example: as USA and many other countries) as a base case and allow both the 
prudential dummy and accounting dummy to interact. 
 
2.3.3 Data 
We collect Bank earnings and balance sheet data from BankScope database for a sample 
period of 12 years from 1999 to 2010. Table 01 presents a summary of variable descriptions and 
their data source and expected signs and implications. 
 
2.3.4 Econometric techniques 
To start with our analysis, we use panel data approach to analyze the empiric 
specifications mentioned in Equation (1), (2) and (3). By using Haussmann-Taylor Test to 
analyze whether a Fixed Effect or a Random Effect model is more appropriate. However, we 
also use a GMM technique to obtain more robust estimates as auto-correlation of LLP and 
endogeneity among bank ratios may impart some biases. In GMM estimation, we use two lags 
of dependent variable (i.e. LLP) as instrumental variables. 
 
 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Sample composition 
Overall sample comprises 11 year panel data over 1999 to 2010 period for 7,343 banks 
in 107 countries. BankScope Database reports five major types of accounting standards used in 
the banking industry: U.S. GAAP, Local GAAP that are country specific GAAP), Regulatory 
Standard that are different from country GAAP and set up the regulatory authority, IAS 
(International Accounting Standards), and IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards). 
Current accounting literature categorizes these four accounting standards into two major 
types; local GAAPs and regulatory standards are classified as Rule-based, and IAS and IFRS 
are identified as principles-based standards. Prudential regulations are broadly categorized into 
two types: pro-cyclic regimes that require managers to set aside loan loss provisions based on 
historical defaults rates; and dynamic regimes that use a forward looking probability matrix to 
incorporate the impact of possible future business cycles. 
Panel A of Table 14 summarizes the distribution of banks in the sample: by bank 
specialization and accounting standard, and by prudential regulatory regimes. At present, 
regulatory authorities in 11 countries like: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, India, Italy, Korea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela pursue dynamic prudential regulatory regime; 
however, these countries have shifted from pro-cyclic regime to dynamic regime at different 
times. For example, regulators in Spain, one of the pioneer countries in implementing dynamic 
provisioning, start using dynamic rules as early as 2001. However, Uruguay is relatively recent 
country to initiate such rules in 2007 year. As such the frequency distributions of the sample 
composition depicts the banks in countries that have changed prudential regimes. Panel A 
shows that 206 commercial banks from these 11 countries have shifted from the pro-cyclic 
provisioning regime to the dynamic provisioning regime; the remaining 7,137 banks of the 
other 96 countries in the sample comply with the pro-cyclic rules. 
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Table 14 
Composition of Sample 
 
Overall sample comprises 11 year panel data over 1999 to 2010 period for 7,343 banks in 107 countries. 
Panel A of table 02 summarizes the distribution of banks in the sample: by bank specialization and 
accounting standard, and by prudential regulatory regimes. BankScope Database reports five major 
types of accounting standards used in the banking industry: U.S. GAAP, Local GAAP (that are country 
specific GAAP), Regulatory Standard (that are different from country GAAP and set up the regulatory 
authority), IAS (International Accounting Standards), and IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards). Current accounting literature categorizes these four accounting standards into two major 
types; local GAAPs and regulatory standards are classified as Rule-based, and IAS and IFRS are 
identified as principles-based standards. Prudential regulations are broadly categorized into two types: 
pro-cyclic regimes that require managers to set aside loan loss provisions based on historical defaults 
rates; and dynamic regimes that use a forward looking probability matrix to incorporate the impact of 
possible future business cycles. Panel B and Panel C report accounting practices across the countries 
using Dynamic prudential framework and pro-cyclic prudential framework respectively. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Number of Banks by Prudential Regimes and Accounting Practices 
Rule Based Principle Based Total Total 
  Prudential Regimes Local GAAP Regulatory IFRS IAS Rule Principle 
a) Pro-cyclic Regime     
USA 235 5703 - - 5938 - 
  Non US Pro-cyclic 874 - 270 55 874 325 
a) Pro-cyclic 1109 5703 270 55 6812 325 
b) Dynamic 108 5 93 - 113 93 
  Total 1217 5708 363 55 6925 418 
 
 
Panel B: Accounting Practices in Dynamic Prudential Regime 
Rule Based Principle Based 
Sl. Country Local GAAP Regulatory IFRS IAS 
1 Bolivia 8 - - - 
2 Chile 1 - - - 
3 Colombia 10 - - - 
4 India 46 - - - 
5 Italy - - 68 - 
6 Korea, Rep. of 6 - - - 
7 Paraguay 10 - - - 
8 Peru 5 5 - - 
9 Spain - - 23 - 
10 Uruguay 9 - 2 - 
11 Venezuela 13 - - - 
  Total 108 5 93 - 
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Table 14 
Composition of Sample (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Accounting Practices in Pro-cyclic Prudential Regime 
    Rule Based Principle Based     Rule Based Principle Based 
Sl. Country 
Local 
GAAP Reg. IFRS IAS Sl. Country 
Local 
GAAP Reg. IFRS IAS 
1 Albania - - 2 - 27 Costa-Rica 13 - - - 
2 Algeria 4 - - - 28 Croatia - - 17 - 
3 Angola 1 - - - 29 Cyprus 1 - 3 - 
4 Argentina 22 - - - 30 Czech Rep. 4 - 6 - 
5 Armenia - - 1 2 31 Denmark 25 - - - 
6 Austria 25 - 4 - 32 Dominican Rep. 12 - - - 
7 Azerbaijan - - 5 - 33 Ecuador 16 - - - 
8 Bahamas - - 3 2 34 Egypt   16 - - 4 
9 Bahrain - - 8 - 35 El Salvador 5 - - - 
10 Bangladesh 18 - - - 36 Estonia - - 3 - 
11 Barbados - - 1 - 37 Ethiopia 1 - 1 1 
12 Belarus - - 4 - 38 France 53 - - - 
13 Belgium 12 - - - 39 Georgia Rep.  - - 5 - 
14 Benin 2 - - - 40 Germany 69 - 5 - 
15 Bhutan 2 - - - 41 Guatemala 12 - - - 
16 Bosnia 1 - 5 - 42 Guyana - - 1 1 
17 Botswana - - 1 1 43 Honduras 10 - - - 
18 Brazil 44 - - - 44 Hungary 5 - 5 - 
19 Brunei 1 - - - 45 Indonesia 27 - - - 
20 Bulgaria - - 9 - 46 Iran 4 - - - 
21 Burkina-Faso 3 - - - 47 Israel 10 - - - 
22 Burundi 1 - - - 48 Japan 110 - - - 
23 Cambodia - - - 1 49 Jordan 1 - 10 1 
24 Cameroon 2 - - - 50 Kazakhstan - - 9 - 
25 Canada 27 - - - 51 Kenya - - 8 4 
26 China 12 - 1 1 52 Kuwait - - 5 - 
27 Costa-Rica 13 - - - 53 Kyrgyzstan - - - 1 
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Table 14 
Composition of Sample (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Accounting Practices in Pro-cyclic Prudential Regime (Continued) 
    Rule Based Principle Based     Rule Based Principle Based 
Sl. Country 
Local 
GAAP Reg. IFRS IAS Sl. Country 
Local 
GAAP Reg. IFRS IAS 
54 Latvia - - 6 - 81 Rwanda - - - 2 
55 Lebanon 1 - 8 8 82 Saudi Arabia 1 - 9 - 
56 Lithuania 0 - 6 - 83 Senegal 2 - - - 
57 Luxembourg 35 - - - 84 Serbia 1 - 3 - 
58 Malawi 0 - - 3 85 Sierra Leone - - - 3 
59 Malaysia 25 - - - 86 Slovakia - - 8 - 
60 Mali 3 - - - 87 Slovenia - - 10 - 
61 Malta - - 2 - 88 South Africa 1 - - - 
62 Mauritius - - 2 1 89 Sri Lanka 9 - - - 
63 Mexico 22 - - - 90 St. Kitts & Nevis - - - 2 
64 Moldova Rep. - - 1 1 91 Sudan 5 - - - 
65 Mongolia - - 1 - 92 Suriname 2 - - - 
66 Morocco 2 - - - 93 Swaziland - - - 3 
67 Mozambique - - 2 - 94 Sweden 3 - - - 
68 Nepal 8 - - - 95 Switzerland 75 - 5 - 
69 Netherlands 3 - - - 96 Taiwan 11 - - - 
70 Nicaragua 2 - - - 97 Thailand 13 - - - 
71 Niger 2 - - - 98 Togo 1 - - - 
72 Nigeria 6 - - - 99 Tunisia 3 - - - 
73 Norway 2 - - - 100 Turkey - - 5 - 
74 Oman - - 5 - 101 Uganda - - 1 8 
75 Pakistan 5 - - - 102 Ukraine 2 - 14 - 
76 Panama 2 - 7 - 103 UAE  - - 15 - 
77 Poland 4 - - - 104 United Kingdom 40 - - - 
78 Qatar 1 - 5 - 105 USA 235 5703 - - 
79 Romania - - 8 - 106 Uzbekistan - - 2 - 
80 Russian Fed. 4 - 21 - 107 Zambia 7 - 2 5 
                1109 5703 270 55 
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Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 15 reports the descriptive statistics for the overall bank sample for the period of 2003 
to 2010. Both LLP and EBTP are in percentage; LLP is calculated as the loan loss provisioning 
normalized to the bank total asset and EBTP refers to earnings before tax and provision normalized to 
the total asset. Tier1CAP and TotCAP are the Tier-I regulatory capital and the total regulatory capital 
respectively, both normalized to RWA (Risk Weighted Asset). TotAsset is the total asset (in thousands US 
Dollars). ROA is return of average asset and ROAE is return on average equity. Later, Panel B and C 
present descriptive statistics for: the banks under pro-cyclic regimes vis-à-vis the banks under dynamic 
provisioning regimes and the banks using IFRS accounting standards vis-à-vis the banks using local 
GAAP. Welch t-statistics of the difference in mean is reported at the rightmost column. (***), (**) and 
(*) refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance based on two-tailed test statistics. 
 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Bank Years 
LLP  40.79 17.11 101.96 85,870 
EBTP 17.66 13.60 24.56 77,961 
Tier1Cap 18.96 14.80 24.14 79,762 
TotalCap 1.76 1.50 4.51 86,758 
ROAA 1.05 1.01 2.64 87,296 
ROAE 9.61 9.83 17.44 87,286 
TotalAsset 4,625,954.00 141,568.00 52748,755.00 87,329 
 
 Panel B: Banks under Pro-cyclic provisioning regime vs. banks under Dynamic Regime 
Pro-cyclic Dynamic Welch 
t-stat  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Obs. 
LLP 39.96 16.74 101.42 84143 81.46 48.63 118.78 1727 -14.41 
EBTP 17.74 13.60 24.63 76962 12.09 8.85 17.17 999 10.25 
Tier1CAP 19.01 14.88 24.23 78607 15.09 12.34 16.00 1155 8.21 
TotCAP 1.75 1.50 4.32 85066 2.20 2.01 10.26 1692 -1.82 
ROAA 1.05 1.01 2.64 85477 1.13 0.90 2.68 1819 -1.35 
ROAE 9.57 9.81 17.04 85467 11.60 12.11 30.80 1819 -2.80 
TotAsset 4,164,919.00 136,951.00 49,836,865.00 85509 26,286,730.00 2,831,166.00 128,000,000.00 1820 -7.36 
 
Panel C: Banks using Rule-based Accounting Standard vs. Banks using Principle-based Accounting Standard 
Rule Principle Welch t-
stat  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Obs. 
LLP 37.97 16.41 91.98 81638 95.32 44.89 211.27 4232 -17.58 
EBTP 17.69 13.60 24.82 75473 16.82 13.71 14.74 2488 2.81 
Tier1CAP 18.92 14.71 24.46 76538 19.77 16.16 14.73 3224 -3.11 
TotCAP 1.70 1.50 4.56 82483 2.83 2.26 3.24 4275 -21.82 
ROAA 1.03 1.00 2.54 82839 1.50 1.27 4.03 4457 -7.74 
ROAE 9.51 9.76 15.64 82835 11.52 12.09 37.55 4451 -3.55 
TotAsset 3,772,834.00 133,023.00 46,303,099.00 82865 20,462,381.00 1,122,938.00 120,000,000.00 4464 -9.26 
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Out of 7,347 commercial banks in the sample, 6,925 banks use Local GAAP and 
mandatory regulatory reporting suggested by the respective regulatory that generally conform 
to rule-based accounting standards. On the other hand, the remaining 418 banks use principle 
based accounting standards, like: IFRS and IAS. Out of 6,925 banks complying with rule-based 
accounting standards, 113 banks fall under the purview of dynamic regulations while the 
remaining 6812 banks adhere to pro-cyclic provisioning. Among 418 banks using principle-
based accounting standards, 325 banks fall under pro-cyclic provisioning while 93 banks 
comply with dynamic provisioning. In the overall sample, 5938 US banks constitute a 
significant portion and fall under pro-cyclic provisioning and comply with rule-based 
accounting standards. However, there is some diversity among US banks in using accounting 
standards. While 235 US banks comply with USGAAP, 5703 banks adhere to the regulatory 
standard suggested by the regulatory authorities; accounting literature identifies both 
USGAAP and regulatory standards as rule-based standards. Later, Panel B and Panel C report 
accounting practices across the countries using Dynamic prudential framework and pro-cyclic 
prudential framework respectively. 
 
2.4.2 Bank characteristics 
Table 15 reports the descriptive statistics for the overall bank sample for the period of 
2000 to 2010. LLP and EBTP are loan loss provisioning and earnings before tax and provision 
normalized to bank total assets respectively; Tier1Cap and TotCAP are respectively Tier-I 
regulatory capital and total regulatory capital, both normalized with respect to Risk Weighted 
Asset (RWA). TotalAsset is the bank total asset; ROAA and ROAE are respectively return on 
average asset and return on average equity. LLP, EBTP, Tier1Cap, TotalCap, ROAA and 
ROAE are measured in percentile. TotalAsset is presented in thousand dollars. Panel A 
presents the summary statistics of these variables for the overall sample in general. Mean bank 
asset size is around 4.63 billion USD while the median bank size is 141.6 million; the standard 
deviation of bank asset reveals the large variations among the banks in terms of their sizes. 
Similar to bank asset sizes, the distribution of LLP is also right skewed, unlike the other 
variables, like: EBTP, Tier1Cap, TotalCap, ROAA and ROAE. 
Panel B of Table 15 reports the summary statistics of bank asset size, and other 
variables: LLP, EBTP, Tier1CAP, TotCAP, ROAA and ROAE for banks under pro-cyclic loan 
loss provisioning regime and banks under dynamic provisioning regime. Bank managers under 
dynamic provisioning regime generally tend to set aside higher loan loss provision compared to 
their counterpart managers under pro-cyclic regime. While bank managers set aside an average 
of 39.96% of total asset for LLP in pro-cyclic regimes, managers under dynamic regime keep an 
average of 81.46% in LLP. Such findings complement with the fact that EBTP in banks under 
pro-cyclic regime are generally higher than the banks under dynamic provisioning regime. On 
the average, banks under pro-cyclic exhibit higher Tier-I regulatory capital (Tier1CAP) but 
otherwise lower total regulatory capital (TotCAP) as compared to banks under dynamic 
provisioning regime. Such findings suggest that managers are more likely to use LLP in 
managing capital adequacy requirements if LLP is allowed to be considered as part of the 
capital adequacy requirements. Bank asset size information in two different regulatory regimes 
suggests that banks under dynamic regime are generally bigger in asset size. While average 
bank size under dynamic regime is 26.29 billion USD, it is around 4.16 billion USD for banks 
under pro-cyclic regime. 
Panel C of Table 15 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the banks classified by two 
broader type of accounting standards: rule-based standards and principle-based standards. Bank 
managers using principle based accounting standards tend to set aside an average 95.32% of 
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total assets as LLP that is significantly higher than their counterpart managers using rule-
based accounting, an average of 37.97%. Tier-I regulatory capital, total regulatory capital, 
ROAA and ROAE, all these ratios are generally higher in banks following principle-based 
accounting standards. Average asset size for banks using principle-based accounting standard 
is 20.46 billion USD that is significantly larger than average asset size of rule-based accounting 
standard of 3.77 billion USD. 
 
2.4.3 Country control variables 
Table 16 summarizes the descriptive statistics of two broader types of country control 
variables: a) Country macro-economic control variables such as per capita GDP, per capita 
GDP growth, and inflation, and b) country financial and regulatory control variables following 
LLSV(1998 and 2008) variables such as: disclosure, case efficiency, property right, legal origin, 
market capitalization, privatization and spread. Average per capita GDP of the sample 
countries increases steadily as early as in 2000 till 2008. Following the financial crisis of 2008, 
average per capita GDP decreases by 7.15%. Average inflation has a decreasing trend 
beginning since 1999 till 2007; however average inflation increases sharply during 2008 and 
then remains below 5% during 2009 and 2010. While the country macro-economic variables are 
generally time variant as shown in the different panels in Table 16, country financial and 
regulatory control variables are rather constant for given countries; Panel D of Table 04 
presents the summary statistics. 
 
 
2.4.4 Pearson correlation 
 Table 17 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among the key variables of interest 
and different control variables. In general, larger banks tend to set aside higher LLP; they have 
higher EBTP and otherwise lower EBTP growth. LLP is positively related with EBTP and 
bank asset size and otherwise negatively related with regulatory capital requirement ratio; 
country macro-economic variables, such as: inflation and per capita GDP growth have negative 
impact on LLP. Bank earning is positively related with EBTP growth, bank asset size, country 
macro-variables like: per capita GDP growth, inflation. 
While bank managers may use their discretion in classifying the loan portfolios that 
eventually influences the LLP reporting, EBTP as a definition of earning is less prone to 
managerial discretion and country financial control variables that may define the level of 
managerial discretion. Consistent with this argument, we find that although country financial 
control variables generally have no significant impact on EBTP and change in EBTP 
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Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics of Country Control Variables 
 
PerCapGDP 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mean 6971.73 7066.68 6947.00 7298.50 8493.46 9707.51 10549.54 11605.55 13245.68 14879.22 13140.74 13699.81 
Median 1982.54 2027.11 2095.58 2285.06 2621.74 3011.83 3470.52 3918.30 4772.41 5806.00 5414.77 5859.71 
Max 49053.28 46360.39 45789.99 50781.69 64675.97 74516.56 81092.71 90714.82 106983.30 118570.10 105917.80 104390.30 
Min 123.38 110.35 98.13 89.73 82.64 90.48 106.88 120.34 125.12 146.51 164.08 177.66 
Std. Dev. 10178.27 10120.64 9885.74 10560.99 12500.38 14215.22 15225.66 16602.77 18777.49 20755.50 18186.67 18798.37 
Obs. 118 119 119 119 119 119 120 120 120 120 120 120 
             PerCapGDPGrw 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mean -0.75 2.03 1.17 5.36 14.60 15.82 14.04 13.55 17.39 16.95 -7.15 6.56 
Median 0.48 1.21 0.32 6.50 14.79 14.27 11.67 11.01 14.24 17.10 -6.38 5.57 
Max 44.53 44.24 38.73 48.51 52.39 38.74 52.76 57.03 55.67 40.83 18.09 36.11 
Min -32.89 -20.56 -27.82 -62.19 -20.46 -5.01 -2.38 -4.16 0.34 -11.51 -35.26 -14.14 
Std. Dev. 11.40 11.58 9.44 12.37 11.74 8.08 10.51 9.50 9.68 10.11 10.70 9.55 
Obs. 117 118 119 119 119 119 119 120 120 120 120 120 
             INFL 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mean 13.15 12.09 8.55 6.38 6.40 5.76 5.88 5.63 5.84 10.00 4.68 4.89 
Median 3.20 3.79 3.85 2.64 3.09 3.91 4.62 4.46 5.28 8.74 2.99 3.99 
Max 293.73 325.03 152.59 108.89 98.34 51.46 22.96 14.22 18.70 30.37 36.40 29.18 
Min -8.53 -1.77 -5.21 -7.22 -1.79 -3.11 -0.72 0.05 -0.25 1.40 -4.87 -1.42 
Std. Dev. 37.51 35.25 18.24 12.29 10.64 7.06 4.49 3.69 4.13 6.24 5.78 4.06 
Obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
             DISCL CaseEff  PtyRIGHT LEG_UK LEG_FR LEG_GE LEG_SC LEG_SO MCAP PRIVO SPRD  
Mean 0.58 48.44 2.89 0.22 0.57 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.45 21.12 
Median 0.58 45.15 3.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.28 12.60 
Max 1.00 95.50 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.60 2.05 149.24 
Min 0.00 1.20 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 2.96 
Std. Dev. 0.24 24.41 1.13 0.42 0.50 0.38 0.17 0.10 0.41 0.41 25.56 
Obs. 38 74 106 107 107 107 107 107 85 106 43 
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Table 17 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable Name LLP  EBTP ∆EBTP  Tier1eCap Ln_TotAss PerCapGDP  PerCapGDPGrw INFL DISCL CaseEff  PtyRIGHT MCAP  PRIVO  SPRD  
LLP  1.000           
   
 -----            
   
            
   
EBTP 0.076 1.000          
   
 (0.00) -----           
   
            
   
∆EBTP  -0.002 0.105 1.000         
   
 (0.61) (0.00) -----          
   
            
   
Tier1Cap -0.067 0.163 0.020 1.000        
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----         
   
            
   
Ln_TotAss 0.148 0.009 -0.008 -0.203 1.000       
   
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) -----        
   
            
   
PerCapGDP  -0.006 -0.024 -0.005 -0.004 -0.078 1.000      
   
 (0.13) (0.00) (0.16) (0.29) (0.00) -----       
   
            
   
PerCapGDPGrw -0.141 0.031 0.021 0.015 -0.032 -0.334 1.000     
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----      
   
            
   
INFL -0.074 0.018 0.017 -0.002 0.066 -0.246 0.568 1.000    
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----     
   
            
   
DISCL -0.080 0.000 0.004 0.036 -0.403 0.407 -0.139 -0.333 1.000   
   
 (0.00) (0.99) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----    
   
            
   
CaseEff  -0.059 -0.020 0.001 0.000 -0.111 0.437 -0.218 -0.350 0.580 1.000  
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.90) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----   
   
            
   
PtyRIGHT -0.097 -0.002 0.000 0.034 -0.382 0.554 -0.162 -0.385 0.779 0.607 1.000 
   
 (0.00) (0.57) (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----  
   
            
   
MCAP  -0.091 0.003 0.006 0.041 -0.450 0.468 -0.124 -0.298 0.928 0.558 0.864 1.000   
 (0.00) (0.42) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----    
               
PRIVO  -0.089 0.001 0.006 0.035 -0.452 0.476 -0.133 -0.305 0.918 0.562 0.836 0.972 1.000  
 (0.00) (0.83) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----   
               
SPRD  0.034 0.002 -0.005 -0.017 0.166 -0.258 0.051 0.095 -0.421 -0.361 -0.350 -0.408 -0.419 1.000 
 (0.00) (0.62) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -----  
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Table 18 
Panel Regression on LLP for Overall Sample 
 
Table 18 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model: 
,,-, . &   &/ ,,-,01/2  & 78-,   &4",01/2   &5 ∆78-,01/2  
 &97  4:!#,01/2    &; 4):+ 4:!#,01/2    
(1) 
where, LLP is Loan Loss Provisioning normalized to Total Asset, EBTP is Earnings before Tax and Provision normalized to Total 
Asset and Tier1CAP is Tire I Regulatory Capital normalized to Risk-weighted asset. ∆EBTP is percentage change in EBTP. 
Ln_TotAsset is natural logarithm of total asset (in thousands dollars) of the sample Banks used as Bank specific control variable. 
PerCapGDP, PerCapGDPGr and INFL are per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in US Dollar of the country under the sample, 
growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and Inflation rate (in percentage), used as country control variables. (Description about LLSV 
variables) 
 
Income smoothing hypothesis suggests that bank managers tend to set aside higher LLP during the good times and accordingly LLP is 
positively related with EBTP. Signaling hypothesis suggests that managers may use LLP as a signal of higher supervision and hence LLP 
is positively related with ∆EBTP. Capital management hypothesis argues that managers tend to use LLP as part of Tier-I capital 
requirement during capital shortfalls and hence negatively related with Tier1Cap. Pro-cyclicality of LLP suggests that LLP is positively 
related with its previous lags.  
 
Sample period is 1999 to 2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years in 107 countries. Column (7) reports Haussmann and 
Taylor (1981) test of difference in coefficients for Random Effect versus Fixed Effect estimates. For each variable, first row corresponds 
to coefficient estimates, and second row reports standard deviation. (***), (**) and (*) refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively based on two-tailed test statistics. 
 
     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Period 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Hausman 
Test 
Panel 
GMM 
Bank Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Country Macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Country Financial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Period FE No - No Yes No No - - 
Period RE No - No No No No - - 
Cross Section FE No - No No Yes No - - 
Cross Section RE No   -   No   No   No   Yes   -   -   
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Table 18 
Panel Regression on LLP for Overall Sample (continued) 
 
     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Period 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Hausman 
Test 
Panel 
GMM 
C -14.835 *** -42.427 *** 64.790 *** -29.902 *** 64.790 *** *** -249.188 *** 63.432 *** 
2.673 2.867 8.990 10.110 8.730 11.653 10.086 
LLP(1) (+) 0.535 *** 0.510 *** 0.510 *** 0.498 *** 0.510 *** 0.000 *** 0.332 *** 0.506 *** 
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 
LLP(2) (+) 0.145 *** 0.180 *** 0.176 *** 0.187 *** 0.176 *** 0.000 *** 0.034 *** 0.183 *** 
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005 
Tier1Cap (-) -0.102 *** -0.086 *** -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.091 *** 0.001 *** -0.214 *** -0.089 *** 
0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.028 0.011 
EBTP (+) 0.808 *** 0.552 *** 0.556 *** 0.590 *** 0.556 *** 0.006 *** 0.039 *** 0.537 *** 
0.075 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.066 0.000 0.100 0.068 
∆ EBTP (+) -0.014 -0.027 -0.009 0.062 -0.009 0.002 *** 0.237 0.004 
0.142 0.137 0.137 0.135 0.133 0.000 0.142 0.137 
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Table 18 
Panel Regression on LLP for Overall Sample (continued) 
     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Period 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Hausman 
Test 
Panel 
GMM 
a. Bank Control 
Ln_TotAsset 3.750 *** 3.800 *** 3.635 *** 3.583 *** 3.635 *** 1.166 *** 23.898 *** 3.683 *** 
0.155 0.150 0.191 0.189 0.186 0.000 1.096 0.192 
b. Country Macro-economic 
GDP 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GDPGROWTH -2.068 *** -3.597 *** -3.294 *** 0.349 *** -3.294 *** 0.001 *** -3.336 *** -3.581 *** 
0.067 0.100 0.098 0.149 0.095 0.213 0.101 0.102 
INFL 0.464 *** -0.489 *** -1.376 *** -0.724 *** -1.376 *** 0.011 *** -2.455 *** -1.160 *** 
0.149 0.198 0.201 0.318 0.195 0.000 0.222 0.210 
    
c. Country Financial 
PRIVO -- -- -22.513 *** 5.193 -22.513 *** -- -20.694 *** 
4.561 5.015 4.429 5.077 
MCAP -- -- 34.833 *** 12.110 * 34.833 *** -- 33.549 *** 
7.327 7.389 7.115 8.313 
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Table 18 
Panel Regression on LLP for Overall Sample (continued) 
 
     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel 
GMM 
Pooled 
OLS 
Period 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Cross 
FE 
Hausman 
Test 
Panel 
GMM 
SPREAD -- -- -0.058 0.008 -0.058 -- -0.099 ** 
0.044 0.046 0.043 0.045 
PTYRGHT -- -- -11.727 *** 1.965 -11.727 -- -10.512 *** 
1.926 2.574 1.870 2.098 
REG -- -- 0.767 0.469 0.767 -- -0.100 
1.360 1.347 1.321 1.363 
DISCL -- -- 19.693 * -9.766 19.693 -- 19.918 * 
10.563 11.747 10.258 11.726 
CaseEFF -- -- -1.034 *** -0.210 *** -1.034 *** -- -1.092 *** 
0.061 0.073 0.060 0.066 
    
Adj. R-sq. 0.390 0.397 0.400 0.413 0.400 0.434 0.402 
Period F (8,55356) 149.967 
                0                   
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2.5 Empirical Evidence 
2. 5.1 Evidence on Loan Loss Provisioning: Overall Sample 
First we analyze the evidence of LLP in the overall sample without differentiating the 
accounting standards and prudential regulatory regimes. We analyze empiric evidence for three 
major explanations: a) income smoothing, b) signaling and c) capital management. Income 
smoothing hypothesis suggests that bank managers tend to set aside higher LLP during the 
good times; accordingly LLP is positively related with EBTP. Signaling hypothesis argues that 
managers may use LLP as a signal of higher supervision and hence LLP is positively related 
with ∆EBTP. Capital management hypothesis suggests that managers tend to use LLP as part 
of Tier-I capital requirement during capital shortfalls and hence negatively related with 
Tier1Cap. Besides these three explanations of LLP, we also analyze the evidence of pro-
cyclicality in LLP which suggests that LLP should be positively related with its own lags. 
Overall sample period is 1999 to 2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years 
in 107 countries. Table 18 presents the Panel regression estimates of equation (1). First, we 
find that LLP is positively related with its own lag at first degree and second degree; such 
finding is consistent with the pro-cyclicality of LLP. As only 21 countries out of the 107 
countries have initiated some sort of dynamic provisioning and other countries generally follow 
prudential regulations that are primarily pro-cyclic, for the overall sample we find a robust 
evidence of pro-cyclicality of LLP. Second, we note that, in general, LLP is negatively related 
with Tier1Cap calculated as Tier-I Capital normalized to Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). This 
suggests that bank managers generally use LLP as part of capital management tool by 
including LLP as part of tier I capital requirement. 
Third, LLP is positively related with EBTP (Earning before tax and provisions) which 
suggests that managers tend to set aside higher provisioning during the good times to 
smoothen the earning during bad times; this finding is consistent with the Income Smoothing 
argument. Fourth, we find week or no evidence supporting the signaling argument that 
suggest managers tend to signal better earning quality by setting aside higher provisioning 
during a period preceding the good times. All the findings are generally robust of regression 
techniques and after controlled for bank size effects, country macro-economic and financial and 
legal factors. 
 
2.5.2 Changes in Prudential Regulations and LLP 
In Hypothesis II, we argue that LLP under different prudential regulations may be 
systematically different. Accordingly in equation (2), we consider most commonly prevalent 
pro-cyclic regime as the base case and include a dummy for Dynamic provision in the analysis; 
Table 19 presents the regression estimates for equation (2). We find that change in prudential 
regime, from a pro-cyclic to a dynamic one, shows little or week evidence of pro-cyclicality in 
LLP as LLP becomes weakly or little related with its own lags at order one and two. For 
capital management and income smoothing hypothesis, we find that managers under dynamic 
provisioning also use LLP as tool for capital management and income smoothing like their 
counterparts in otherwise pro-cyclic prudential regimes. Besides, empirical evidence for LLP 
being used as a tool for signaling earning quality is also weak. Finally, we find significant 
negative fixed effect for “dynamic dummy” supporting the argument that managerial discretion 
in bank earning management in LLP is much lower under dynamic regime. 
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Table 19 
LLP and prudential regulatory regimes 
 
Table 18 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model: 
,,-, . &  &/ ,,-,01/2   & 78-,   &4",01/2   &5 ∆78-,01/2    / + *  
        + *  ,,-,01/2   + *  78-,    5+ *  4",01/2  (2) 
       9 + *  ∆78-,01/2  &97  4:!#,01/2   &; 4):+ 4:!#,01/2  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where, LLP is the loan loss provisioning normalized to the bank total asset, EBTP is the earnings before tax and provision normalized to the 
bank total Asset; and Tier1CAP is the Tire I regulatory capital normalized to risk-weighted asset. ∆EBTP is percentage change in EBTP. 
Ln_TotAsset is the log of the total asset of the sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as a bank-specific control variable. used as Three 
country control variables are PerCapGDP, PerCapGDPGr and INFL that are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in US Dollar of the 
countries under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and inflation rate (in percentage), respectively. DYNAMIC is a 
dummy variable which is 1 if the prudential regulatory regime of a country follows a dynamic regime and otherwise zero for a pro-cyclical 
regime. Sample period is 1999 to 2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years in 107 countries. Column (5) reports Haussmann and 
Taylor (1981) test of difference in coefficients for Random Effect versus Fixed Effect estimates. For each variable, first row corresponds to 
coefficient estimates, and second row reports standard deviation. (***), (**) and (*) refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
based on two-tailed test statistics. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pooled OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Haus Panel GMM 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Var(Diff.)  Coeff. 
Bank Contol Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Country Macro Control Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Country Financial & Legal Control Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Period FE No Yes No No - - 
Period RE No No No No - - 
Cross Section FE No No Yes No - - 
Cross Section RE No No No Yes - - 
C  100.346 *** 7.217 100.346 *** -248.685 *** 117.403 *** 
10.110 12.584 9.828 11.658 11.448 
LLP(1) (+) 0.508 *** 0.498 *** 0.508 *** 0.333 *** 0.000 *** 0.505 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.005 
LLP(2) (+) 0.176 *** 0.187 *** 0.176 *** 0.034 *** 0.000 *** 0.183 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 
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Table 19 
LLP and prudential regulatory regimes (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pooled OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Haus Panel GMM 
Tier1Cap (-) -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.091 *** -0.212 *** 0.001 *** -0.089 *** 
0.011 0.011 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.011 
EBTP (+) 0.542 *** 0.580 *** 0.542 *** 0.033 0.006 *** 0.530 *** 
0.068 0.067 0.066 0.100 0.000 0.068 
∆ EBTP (+) -0.030 0.049 -0.030 0.236 0.002 *** -0.021 
0.138 0.137 0.135 0.143 0.000 0.138 
a. Impact of Dynamic Provisioning 
DYNAMIC -47.187 *** -28.628 *** -47.187 *** NA -42.269 *** 
6.231 6.612 6.057 6.597 
DYNAMIC*LLP(1) -0.042 0.007 -0.042 -0.202 *** 0.001 *** -0.098 
0.058 0.057 0.056 0.063 0.000 0.065 
DYNAMIC*LLP(2) 0.041 -0.057 0.041 0.085 0.001 *** 0.020 
0.055 0.055 0.054 0.060 0.000 0.062 
DYNAMIC*Tier1CAP -1.030 *** -0.429 -1.030 *** -2.105 *** 0.692 *** -0.914 *** 
0.348 0.346 0.339 0.898 0.000 0.353 
DYNAMIC*EBTP 11.253 *** 7.353 *** 11.253 *** 6.178 *** 4.511 *** 6.889 *** 
1.775 1.767 1.725 2.736 0.000 1.921 
DYNAMIC*∆ EBTP 0.292 0.184 0.292 -0.385 0.319 *** 0.637 
0.845 0.837 0.821 0.997 0.000 0.846 
b. Bank Control 
Ln_TotAsset 3.700 *** 3.637 *** 3.700 *** 23.879 *** 1.167 3.715 *** 
0.191 0.190 0.186 1.096 0.000 0.192 
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Table 19 
LLP and prudential regulatory regimes (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pooled OLS Per FE 
Cross 
RE Cross FE Haus Panel GMM 
c. Country Macro 
PerCapGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PerCapGDPGr -3.167 *** 0.355 *** -3.167 *** -3.371 *** 0.001 *** -3.440 *** 
0.099 0.150 0.097 0.101 0.000 0.104 
INFL -2.051 *** -1.509 *** -2.051 *** -2.413 *** 0.007 *** -1.869 *** 
0.212 0.352 0.206 0.222 0.000 0.221 
d. Country Financial & Legal Control 
PRIVO -25.236 *** -1.230 -25.236 *** NA -24.555 *** 
4.588 5.184 4.460 NA 5.107 
MCAP 38.455 *** 19.569 *** 38.455 *** NA 43.156 *** 
7.378 7.574 7.172 NA 8.391 
SPREAD -0.113 *** -0.015 -0.113 *** NA -0.163 *** 
0.044 0.046 0.043 NA 0.046 
PTYRGHT -14.264 *** -5.053 * -14.264 *** NA -15.715 *** 
2.107 2.967 2.048 NA 2.291 
REGULATORY 0.521 0.488 0.521 NA -0.320 
1.359 1.347 1.321 NA 1.361 
DISCL 11.693 -7.737 11.693 NA 4.349 
10.768 11.891 10.468 NA 11.897 
CaseEff -1.254 *** -0.425 *** -1.254 *** NA -1.352 *** 
0.066 0.085 0.064 NA 0.071 
Adj. R-sqd 0.402 0.413 0.402 0.435 0.403 
Period FE Fstat                 (8,55350) 137.310 
        0.000                   
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Table 20 
LLP and Bank accounting standards  
 
Table 20 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model: 
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where, LLP is the loan loss provisioning normalized to the bank total asset, EBTP is the earnings before tax and provision normalized to the 
bank total Asset; and Tier1CAP is the Tire I regulatory capital normalized to risk-weighted asset. ∆EBTP is percentage change in EBTP. 
Ln_TotAsset is the log of the total asset of the sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as a bank-specific control variable. used as Three 
country control variables are PerCapGDP, PerCapGDPGr and INFL that are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in US Dollar of the 
countries under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and inflation rate (in percentage), respectively. IFRS is a dummy 
variable that is 1 if a bank follows IFRS accounting standard and otherwise 0 for other standards. Sample period is 1999 to 2010 with 7,343 
banks and a total of 57,967 bank years in 107 countries.  For each variable, first row corresponds to coefficient estimates, and second row reports 
standard deviation. (***), (**) and (*) refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively based on two-tailed test statistics. 
 
 
Panel A: Description of Regression Equations and control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
Bank Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Macro Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Financial & Legal 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE No Yes No No - 
Period RE No No No No - 
Cross Section FE No No Yes No - 
Cross Section RE No   No   No   Yes   -   
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Table 20 
LLP and Bank accounting standards (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
C 107.926 *** 12.536 107.926 *** -- 117.843 *** 
9.692 11.470 9.422 11.133 
LLP(1)                      (+) 0.508 *** 0.497 *** 0.508 *** 0.000 *** 0.504 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.005 
LLP(2)                      (+) 0.177 *** 0.187 *** 0.177 *** 0.000 *** 0.183 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 
Tier1CAP                 (-) -0.091 *** -0.092 *** -0.091 *** 0.001 *** -0.089 *** 
0.011 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.011 
EBTP                        (+) 0.543 *** 0.580 *** 0.543 *** 0.006 *** 0.524 *** 
0.068 0.067 0.066 0.000 0.068 
∆EBTP                     (+) -0.030 0.051 -0.030 0.002 *** -0.019 
0.139 0.137 0.135 0.000 0.138 
a. Bank Control 
Ln_TotAsset 3.810 *** 3.758 *** 3.810 *** 1.169 *** 3.851 *** 
0.194 0.192 0.188 0.000 0.194 
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Table 20 
LLP and Bank accounting standards (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
b. Impact of Principle based Standard 
PRINCIPLE -59.484 * 3.390 -59.484 * -- -66.383 ** 
30.213 30.777 29.371 31.939 
PRINCIPLE*LLP(1) -0.115 0.068 -0.115 0.003 *** -0.130 
0.095 0.094 0.092 0.001 0.105 
PRINCIPLE*LLP(2) -0.138 -0.165 * -0.138 0.004 *** -0.167 
0.098 0.098 0.096 0.000 0.105 
PRINCIPLE*Tier1CAP 0.208 -0.043 0.208 0.131 0.247 
0.257 0.257 0.250 0.872 0.273 
PRINCIPLE*EBTP 1.360 0.229 1.360 3.446 1.424 
1.912 1.894 1.858 0.534 1.976 
PRINCIPLE*∆EBTP 1.166 0.662 1.166 0.291 1.236 
0.837 0.829 0.813 0.182 0.837 
PRINCIPLE*Ln_TotAsset 0.955 -2.129 0.955 301.708 *** 1.098 
1.666 1.687 1.620 0.003 1.757 
c. Country Macro Controls 
PerCapGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Page 60 
 
Table 20 
LLP and Bank accounting standards  
 
Panel B: Regression Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
PerCapGDPGr -3.202 *** 0.328 ** -3.202 *** 0.001 *** -3.506 *** 
0.098 0.149 0.096 0.000 0.103 
INFL -1.943 *** -1.645 *** -1.943 *** 0.009 *** -1.660 *** 
0.207 0.339 0.201 0.000 0.215 
d. Country Financial Control 
PRIVO -32.570 *** -2.765 -32.570 *** -- -32.082 *** 
4.692 5.278 4.562 5.253 
MCAP 49.069 *** 25.130 *** 49.069 *** -- 49.773 *** 
7.475 7.633 7.266 8.495 
SPREAD -0.151 *** -0.073 -0.151 *** -- -0.212 *** 
0.045 0.046 0.043 0.046 
PTYRGHT -9.800 *** 2.007 -9.800 ** -- -8.253 *** 
1.951 2.632 1.897 2.125 
REG 0.501 0.533 0.501 -- -0.261 
1.362 1.349 1.324 1.364 
DISCL -1.858 -30.207 * -1.858 -- -7.440 
10.935 12.283 10.631 12.289 
CaseEff -1.431 *** -0.526 *** -1.431 *** -- -1.577 
0.070 0.085 0.068 0.077 
Adj. R-sq. 0.402 0.414 0.402 0.403 
139.381 6800.692 
(8,55349) (15) 
      0       0       
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Table 21 
Combined Impact of changes in Prudential Regulation and changes in Accounting Standards on LLP 
 
Table 21 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model: 
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where, LLP is the loan loss provisioning normalized to the bank total asset, EBTP is the earnings before tax and provision normalized to the 
bank total Asset; and Tier1CAP is the Tire I regulatory capital normalized to risk-weighted asset. ∆EBTP is percentage change in EBTP. 
Ln_TotAsset is the log of the total asset of the sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as a bank-specific control variable. used as Three 
country control variables are PerCapGDP, PerCapGDPGr and INFL that are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in US Dollar of the 
countries under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and inflation rate (in percentage), respectively. DYNAMIC is a 
dummy variable which is 1 if the prudential regulatory regime of a country follows a dynamic regime and otherwise zero for a pro-cyclical 
regime. IFRS is a dummy variable that is 1 if a bank follows IFRS accounting standard and otherwise 0 for other standards. 
 
Sample period is 1999 to 2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years in 107 countries. Column (5) reports Haussmann and Taylor 
(1981) test of difference in coefficients for Random Effect versus Fixed Effect estimates. For each variable, first row corresponds to coefficient 
estimates, and second row reports standard deviation. (***), (**) and (*) refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively based on two-
tailed test statistics. 
 
(1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
  OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
  Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.       Coeff.   
Bank Contol Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Macro Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Financial & Legal Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE No Yes No No - 
Period RE No No No No - 
Cross Section FE No No Yes No - 
Cross Section RE No   No   No   Yes       -   
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Table 21 
Combined Impact of changes in Prudential Regulation and changes in Accounting Standards on LLP (Continued) 
 
(1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
  OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Haus. Panel GMM 
  Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.       Coeff.   
C 80.102 *** 6.729 80.102 *** -249.763 *** 94.560 *** 
11.001 12.919 10.702 11.874 12.553 
LLP(1) 0.506 *** 0.497 *** 0.506 *** 0.332 *** 0.000 *** 0.503 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.005 
LLP(2) 0.176 *** 0.186 *** 0.176 *** 0.034 *** 0.000 *** 0.183 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 
Tier1Cap -0.091 *** -0.092 *** -0.091 *** -0.211 *** 0.001 *** -0.089 *** 
0.011 0.011 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.011 
EBTP 0.546 *** 0.580 *** 0.546 *** 0.041 0.006 *** 0.529 *** 
0.068 0.067 0.066 0.100 0.000 0.068 
∆EBTP -0.020 0.052 -0.020 0.236 0.002 -0.011 
0.138 0.137 0.135 0.143 0.000 0.138 
a. Bank Size Control 
Ln_Tot_Asset 3.813 *** 3.747 *** 3.813 *** 23.980 *** 1.166 *** 3.823 *** 
0.192 0.191 0.187 1.096 0.000 0.193 
b. Country Macro-economic control 
PerCapGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PerCapGDPGr -3.339 *** 0.251 -3.339 *** -3.497 *** 0.001 *** -3.660 *** 
0.102 0.158 0.099 0.104 0.000 0.107 
 
 
 
Page 63 
 
Table 21 
Combined Impact of changes in Prudential Regulation and changes in Accounting Standards on LLP (Continued) 
 
(1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
  OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
  Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.       Coeff.   
INFL -2.002 *** -1.574 *** -2.002 *** -2.301 *** 0.007 *** -1.700 *** 
0.214 0.356 0.208 0.223 0.000 0.222 
c. Accounting standard fixed effect 
PRINCIPLE -21.131 *** -32.944 *** -21.131 *** NA -19.97 *** 
6.309 6.528 6.137 NA 7.457 
d. Prudential regulation fixed effect 
DYNAMIC -32.19 *** -10.97 -32.19 *** NA -23.61 ** 
8.583 8.629 8.349 NA 10.033 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*LLP(1) 0.285 0.278 0.285 * -0.272 0.021 0.295 * 
0.174 0.172 0.169 0.222 0.000 0.175 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*LLP(2) 0.009 -0.006 0.009 -0.535 0.074 0.017 
0.222 0.220 0.216 0.348 0.046 0.226 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*Tier1CAP 0.194 0.154 0.194 0.464 0.870 0.153 
0.384 0.381 0.373 1.004 0.773 0.389 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*EBTP 0.245 0.047 0.245 1.024 4.025 0.165 
2.142 2.123 2.084 2.893 0.698 2.157 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*∆EBTP 0.532 0.398 0.532 -0.152 0.393 0.490 
0.857 0.850 0.834 1.044 0.276 0.857 
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Table 21 
Combined Impact of changes in Prudential Regulation and changes in Accounting Standards on LLP (Continued) 
(1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
  OLS Per FE 
Cross 
RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*Ln_TotAsset 0.116 -0.819 0.116 6.134 1699.904 0.200 
1.662 1.686 1.617 41.262 0.884 1.737 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*PerCapGDP -0.003 *** 0.000 -0.003 *** 0.004 0.000 ** -0.003 *** 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.021 0.001 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*PerCapGDPGr 1.188 0.358 1.188 ** 2.165 *** 0.167 ** 1.629 *** 
0.558 0.561 0.543 0.679 0.017 0.584 
DYNAMIC*PRINCIPLE*INFL 17.277 *** 3.143 17.277 *** 0.578 20.800 *** 17.054 *** 
3.271 3.348 3.182 5.561 0.000 3.499 
g. Country Financial Control  
PRIVO -36.339 *** -5.984 -36.339 *** -- -34.528 *** 
4.722 5.478 4.593 5.241 
MCAP 29.471 *** 22.848 *** 29.471 *** NA 30.864 *** 
7.767 7.809 7.555 NA 8.859 
SPREAD -0.169 *** -0.073 -0.169 *** NA -0.228 *** 
0.045 0.047 0.043 NA 0.046 
PTYRIGHT -1.369 3.294 -1.369 NA -1.385 
2.487 3.213 2.420 NA 2.781 
REG 0.559 0.469 0.559 NA -0.288 
1.359 1.348 1.322 NA 1.361 
DISCL 37.163 *** -18.027 37.163 *** NA 29.306 ** 
11.874 14.181 11.551 NA 13.146 
CaseEff -1.658 *** -0.603 -1.658 *** NA -1.773 *** 
0.076 0.102 0.074 NA 0.084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403   0.414   0.403   0.435       0.404   
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Table 22 
Joint Impact of changes in prudential regime and changes in Accounting Standards: Spanish Evidence 
 
Table 22 reports Panel Regression results on LLP for the following model: 
,,-, . &  &/ ,,-,01/2   & 78-,   &4",01/2   &5 ∆78-,01/2    / =   
        =   ,,-,01/2   =   78-,   5=   4",01/2  (4) 
       9 =   ∆78-,01/2   &97  4:!#,01/2   &; 4):+ 4:!#,01/2    
where, LLP is the loan loss provisioning normalized to the bank total asset, EBTP is the earnings before tax and provision normalized to the 
bank total Asset; and Tier1CAP is the Tire I regulatory capital normalized to risk-weighted asset. ∆EBTP is percentage change in EBTP. 
Ln_TotAsset is the log of the total asset of the sample Banks (in thousand dollars) used as a bank-specific control variable. used as Three 
country control variables are PerCapGDP, PerCapGDPGr and INFL that are the per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in US Dollar of the 
countries under the sample, their growth in per capita GDP (in percentage) and inflation rate (in percentage), respectively. SPAIN is a dummy 
variable which is 1 if the bank belongs to Spain and otherwise zero for non-Spanish banks. 
 
Sample period is 1999 to 2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years in 107 countries. Column (5) reports Haussmann and Taylor 
(1981) test of difference in coefficients for Random Effect versus Fixed Effect estimates. For each variable, first row corresponds to coefficient 
estimates, and second row reports standard deviation. (***), (**) and (*) refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively based on two-
tailed test statistics. 
Panel A: Description of Regression Equations and control variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Haus Panel GMM 
  Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.       Coeff.   
Bank Contol Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Country Macro Control Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Country Financial & Legal Control Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Period FE No Yes No No - - 
Period RE No No No No - - 
Cross Section FE No No Yes No - - 
Cross Section RE No   No   No   Yes   -   -   
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Table 22 
Joint Impact of changes in prudential regime and changes in Accounting Standards: Spanish Evidence 
 
Panel B: Regression Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
  Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.   Coeff.       Coeff.   
C 64.884 *** -25.944 ** 64.884 *** -252.229 *** 63.228 *** 
9.223 10.336 8.956 11.967 10.397 
LLP(1) 0.510 *** 0.498 *** 0.510 *** 0.332 *** 0.000 *** 0.506 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.005 
LLP(2) 0.176 *** 0.187 *** 0.176 *** 0.034 *** 0.000 *** 0.183 *** 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 
Tier1Cap -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.091 *** -0.214 *** 0.001 *** -0.089 *** 
0.011 0.011 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.011 
EBTP 0.556 *** 0.590 *** 0.556 *** 0.040 0.006 *** 0.537 *** 
0.068 0.067 0.066 0.100 0.000 0.068 
∆EBTP -0.008 0.062 -0.008 0.238 * 0.002 *** 0.004 
0.137 0.135 0.133 0.142 0.000 0.137 
Ln_TotAsset 3.637 *** 3.599 *** 3.637 *** 23.899 *** 1.166 *** 3.684 *** 
0.192 0.190 0.186 1.096 0.000 0.192 
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Table 22 
Joint Impact of changes in prudential regime and changes in Accounting Standards: Spanish Evidence 
 
Panel B: Regression Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS Per FE Cross RE Cross FE Panel GMM 
SPAIN 5.004 102.652 5.004 NA -18.614 
168.890 167.273 163.997 NA 194.897 
SPAIN*LLP(1) 0.391 0.402 0.391 -1.244 0.695 * 0.356 
0.723 0.715 0.702 1.089 0.050 0.767 
SPAIN*LLP(2) 0.213 0.201 0.213 0.082 0.577 0.339 
0.752 0.744 0.730 1.054 0.863 0.994 
SPAIN*Tier1Cap 2.390 2.392 2.390 31.359 382.014 2.447 
4.140 4.096 4.020 19.954 0.138 6.150 
SPAIN*EBTP 6.191 6.157 6.191 -34.397 1447.102 7.006 
4.096 16.837 16.524 41.475 0.286 44.502 
SPAIN*∆EBTP -10.776 -10.847 -10.776 25.832 365.107 * 18.291 
21.768 21.537 21.137 28.494 0.055 68.840 
SPAIN*Ln_TotAsset -3.305 -3.266 -3.305 231.090 43768.159 -3.059 
6.547 6.478 6.357 209.305 0.263 11.011 
SPAIN*PerCapGDP 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000 
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.336 0.004 
SPAIN*PerCapGDPGr 2.746 0.843 2.746 3.068 0.852 2.999 
1.890 1.873 1.836 2.055 0.727 2.008 
SPAIN*INFL -2.434 -3.414 -2.434 14.704 129.524 1.938 
10.304 10.201 10.005 15.154 0.132 11.648 
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Table 22 
Joint Impact of changes in prudential regime and changes in Accounting Standards: Spanish Evidence 
Panel B: Regression Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PerCapGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PerCapGDPGr -3.312 *** 0.371 ** -3.312 *** -3.359 *** 0.001 -3.604 *** 
0.098 0.150 0.096 0.101 0.167 0.103 
INFL -1.365 *** -0.832 ** -1.365 *** -2.439 *** 0.011 *** -1.144 *** 
0.202 0.323 0.196 0.222 0.000 0.211 
PRIVO -22.515 *** 5.477 -22.515 *** NA -20.634 *** 
4.567 5.019 4.435 NA 5.089 
MCAP 34.873 *** 15.042 ** 34.873 *** NA 33.311 *** 
7.510 7.551 7.292 NA 8.555 
SPREAD -0.058 0.000 -0.058 NA -0.099 
0.044 0.046 0.043 NA 0.045 
PTYRIGHTS -11.679 *** 2.153 -11.679 *** NA -10.420 *** 
1.935 2.579 1.879 NA 2.110 
REGULATORY 0.770 0.520 0.770 NA -0.102 
1.361 1.347 1.321 NA 1.363 
DISCLOSE 19.534 * -18.738 19.534 * NA 20.248 
11.154 12.705 10.831 NA 12.427 
CASEAEFFICIENCY -1.036 *** -0.183 ** -1.036 *** NA -1.094 *** 
0.062 0.075 0.060 NA 0.066 
Adj. R-sq. 0.400   0.413   0.400   0.434       0.402   
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2.5.3 Changes in Accounting Standards and LLP 
In Hypothesis III, we argue that LLP under different accounting standards may be 
systematically different. Accordingly in equation (2), we consider most commonly prevalent 
rule-based accounting standards as the base case and include a dummy for principle-based 
accounting standard in the analysis; Table 20 presents the regression estimates for equation (3). 
We find that change in accounting standards, from a rule-based standard to a principle-based 
standard, does not exhibit significant difference in the interaction terms. However, we do find 
significant negative fixed effect supporting the argument that managerial discretion in bank 
earning management in LLP is much lower under principles-based accounting standard. 
 
2.5.4 Joint effect of changes in prudential regime and accounting standard  
Finally in Hypothesis IV, we analyze what type of systematic impact a joint change in 
prudential regime and accounting standard may have over bank earning management. We 
include both Dynamic dummy and Principle based accounting standard dummies in a set up 
given in equation (4); Table 21 reports the regression estimates. We find that change in 
prudential regime from a pro-cyclic to a dynamic regime has a significant positive fixed effect 
on LLP. For change in accounting standard from a rule-based to a principle-based one, we 
rather find has a negative fixed effect on LLP. However, the interaction of Dynamic and 
Principle dummies with the lags of LLP, EBTP, change in EBTP and Tier1Cap, do not reveal 
much of significant differences. 
In our dataset, Spain represents the only country to have gone both changes in 
prudential regime and accounting standards; accordingly we include a dummy for Spanish 
banks and report regression estimates for equation (5) in Table 22. Consistent with our 
findings from Table 21, from Table 22, we do not find much of difference in earning 
management by bank managers in Spain. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 This paper analyzes the systematic impact of changes in accounting standards and 
changes in prudential regulations on bank earning management in terms of loan loss 
provisioning (LLP). Earlier literature in bank earning management finds rather conflicting 
evidence about LLP and generally presents three commonly cited arguments: a) income 
smoothing hypothesis, b) capital management hypothesis and c) signaling hypothesis. We 
extend this bank earning management by revisiting these three arguments with more recent 
data and a larger sample that includes 7,343 individual banks in 107 countries. Throughout the 
analysis, we control for bank size effect, country macro-economic factors and country financial 
and legal factors. 
 We find that bank managers, in general, engage in LLP for income smoothing and 
capital management purposes. However, we find little or weak evidence supporting signaling 
argument that managers may use LLP as a signal of better earning quality. On change in 
prudential regime from a pro-cyclic to a dynamic regime, we find significant negative fixed 
effect supporting the argument that managerial discretion in bank earning management in LLP 
is much lower under dynamic regime. On the impact of changes in accounting standards, we 
find significant negative fixed effect on LLP supporting the argument that managerial 
discretion in bank earning management in LLP is much lower under principles-based 
accounting standard. Such findings are consistent with Capkun et al (2010) who find principles-
based accounting standard provide less managerial discretion in earning management. 
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To conclude, we argue that differences in prudential regulatory regimes and accounting 
standards may have some systematic impact on bank earning management in LLP; accordingly 
such differences may be impo to be included in future earning management research. 
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Appendix A 
 
Asset Purchase windows by Federal Reserve and Description of Key Events 
Event Date Event Description CODE Type 
1. August 17, 2007 Fed increases the maximum primary credit 
borrowing term to 30 days, renewable by 
borrower. FOMC also cuts the discount rate by 50 
basis points 
DW Pre-QE 
Program Program Description 
A Term Auction Facility: (TAF) 
FED will auction term funds to depository institutions. All depository institutions that are eligible to 
borrow under the primary credit program will be eligible to participate in TAF auctions. All advances 
must be fully collateralized. Each TAF auction will be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by 
the auction process (subject to a minimum bid rate). Bids will be submitted by phone through local 
Reserve Banks. 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
2 December 12, 2007 Fed announces the creation of a TAF OpenTAF Pre-QE 
3 December 12, 2007 Fed announces that TAF auctions will be 
conducted every 2 weeks as long as financial 
market conditions warrant 
ExtTAF1 Pre-QE 
4 March 7, 2008 Fed announces $50 billion TAF auctions on 
March 10 and March 24 and extends the TAF for 
at least 6 months 
ExtTAF2 Pre-QE 
 March 8, 2010 Closed CloseTAF QE 
     
Program Program Description 
B. Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF) 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), 
which will lend up to $200 billion of Treasury securities for 28-day terms against federal agency debt, 
federal agency residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS), non-agency AAA/Aaa private label 
residential MBS, and other securities. The FOMC increases its swap lines with the ECB by $10 billion 
and the Swiss National Bank by $2 billion and also extends these lines through September 30, 2008. 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
 March 11, 2008 Fed announces the creation of the TSLF OpenTSLF Pre-QE 
  March 31, 2010 Closed CloseTSLF QE 
     
Program Program Description 
C. Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) 
FED Board establishes Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), extending credit to primary dealers at 
the primary credit rate against a broad range of investment grade securities. The Federal Reserve 
Board votes to reduce the primary credit rate 25 basis points to 3.25 percent, lowering the spread 
between the primary credit rate and FOMC target for the federal funds rate to 25 basis points. The 
Board also votes to increase the maximum maturity of primary credit loans to 90 days. 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
 March 16, 2008 PDCF Open OpenPDCF Pre-QE 
 February 1, 2010 PDCF Closed ClosePDCF QE 
     
 
 
Page 75 
 
 
Asset Purchase windows by Federal Reserve and Description of Key Events (continued) 
 
Program Program Description 
D. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
FED Board announces the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) to extend non-recourse loans at the primary credit rate to U.S. 
depository institutions and bank holding companies to finance their purchase of high-quality asset-
backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds. The Federal Reserve Board also 
announces plans to purchase federal agency discount notes (short-term debt obligations issued by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks) from primary dealers. 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
 Sept. 19, 2008 AMLF opened OpenAMLF Pre-QE 
 February 1, 2010 AMLF closed CloseAMLF QE 
     
Program Program Description 
E Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
FED Board announces the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which will 
provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper through a special purpose vehicle that 
will purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper directly from eligible 
issuers. 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
 October 7, 2008 CPFF opened OpenCPFF Pre-QE 
 February 1, 2010 CPFF Closed ClosedCPFF QE 
     
Program Program Description 
F Money Market Investor Funding Facility(MMIFF) 
FED Board announces creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). Under 
the facility, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides senior secured funding to a series of 
special purpose vehicles to facilitate the purchase of assets from eligible 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
 October 21, 2008 MMIFF Opened OpenMMIFF Pre-QE 
     
Program Program Description 
G Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) 
FED Board announces the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF), 
under which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will lend up to $200 billion on a non-recourse 
basis to holders of AAA-rated asset-backed securities and recently originated consumer and small 
business loans. The U.S. Treasury will provide $20 billion of TARP money for credit protection. 
Events Date Event Description CODE Type 
 March 3, 2009 TALF opened OpenTALF  
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Appendix B 
Granger Causality Results 
 
 
Table I 
Granger Causality between Expected, Unexpected Monetary Shocks and Monetary Policy Tools 
 
Panel A of Table I reports Granger Causality between Monetary Shocks and conventional monetary policy tools: i) 
DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , and Federal Reserve System’s liability side tools such as: ii) log(M1) in natural 
logarithm of Narrow Money (in billion dollars), iii) log(NONM1) as natural logarithm of components of M2 not 
included in M1 (in billion dollars). Panel B reports Granger Causality between conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy tools: ii) log(TOTSPEC) as natural logarithm of total holding (in billion dollars) in special asset 
purchase programs by Federal Reserve System.  Panel C presents Granger Causality between the two Monetary 
Shocks and conventional monetary policy tools; log(TOTSPEC). *,** and *** correspond to statistical significance of 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All data are daily frequency. All index returns and bond spreads are in percentage. 
 
Panel A: Monetary Shocks and Conventional Monetary Policy Tools 
 
All   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause EXPSHOCK 
       DFF … reject *** reject *** reject *** 
 LOG(M1) … -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
  LOG(NONM1) … reject *** reject *** reject *** 
 Other Conventional Monetary Tools … --   --   --   
Ho:  EXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      ..  DFF reject *** reject *** reject *** 
..  LOG(M1) -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 ..  LOG(NONM1) -- 
 
reject * -- 
 ..  Other Conventional Monetary Tools --   --   --   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK 
       DFF … reject ** -- 
 
-- 
  LOG(M1) … -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
  LOG(NONM1) … reject *** reject *** -- 
  Other Conventional Monetary Tools … --   --   -- 
 Ho:  UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      ..  DFF reject *** reject *** reject *** 
..  Other Conventional Monetary Tools --   --   --   
 EXSHOCK does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK reject ** -- 
 
reject *** 
 UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause EXSHOCK reject *** reject ** reject *** 
No. of Obs. 462   314   148   
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Panel B: Conventional and Unconventional (Asset-side) Monetary tools 
 
All   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause  log(TOTSPEC) 
       DFF … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
 LOG(M1) … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
 LOG(NONM1) … reject ** reject ** reject ** 
Ho:  log( TOTSPEC) does not Granger Cause .. 
       DFF … reject ** reject ** -- 
  LOG(M1) … -- 
 
reject *** -- 
  LOG(NONM1) … -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 Panel C: Monetary Shocks and Unconventional (Asset-side) Monetary tools 
 
All   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause  log(TOTSPEC) 
        UNEXPSHOCK … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
  EXSHOCK … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
Ho:   log(TOTSPEC) does not Granger Cause .. 
      ..  UNEXPSHOCK -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
..  EXSHOCK … -- 
 
reject ** reject *** 
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Table II 
Causality between Expected and Unexpected Monetary Shocks and Target Variables 
 
Panel A of Table II reports Granger Causality between Monetary Shocks and four Major market indices: Four Market Indices 
are: i) DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, ii) DTWEXM as change in major trade-weighted exchange index, 
iii) SNP500 as return on S&P500 Index and iv) VIX as Implied Volatility Index on S&P500. Panel B reports Granger Causality 
between Monetary Shocks and Three bond spreads: i) AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread, ii) BBB as BBB option-adjusted 
spread, and iii) CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread. Panel C reports Granger Causality between Monetary Shocks and daily swap 
rates for 8 maturities, 1 yr, 2 yr, 3 yr, 4 yr, 5 yr, 7 yr, 10 yr and 30 yr (DSWP1 through DWSP30) while Panel D presents the 
same for different maturities of Commercial Papers both financial and non-financial firms with AA-ratings. DCPF1M, DCPF2M, 
DCPF3M are return on 1 month AA-rating financial commercial paper and DCPN30, DCPN2M, DCPN3M are return on similar 
maturities non-financial commercial papers.  
 
*,** and *** correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All data are daily frequency. All index returns 
and bond spreads are in percentage. 
Panel A: Monetary Shocks and SNP, DJIA, VIX, EXCH Index 
 
Overall   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho: Market Indices does not Granger Cause EXPSHOCK -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 Ho: EXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause Market Indices -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 Ho: Market Indices does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 Ho:  UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. DJIARET reject ** reject ** Reject ** 
.. SP5RET reject *** reject ** Reject ** 
.. VXDCLSRET reject *** reject *** --   
       Causality between Expected and Unexpected Shocks 
       UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause EXSHOCK reject *** reject *** reject *** 
 EXSHOCK does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK reject *** reject *** --   
Panel B: Monetary Shocks and AAA, BBB and CCC Bond Spreads 
 
Overall   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause EXPSHOCK 
      AAASPREAD … -- 
 
reject *** reject ** 
 BBBSPREAD … reject ** reject *** 
   CCCSPREAD … reject *** reject ***     
Ho:  EXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. AAASPREAD -- 
 
reject *** 
  .. BBBSPREAD -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
.. CCCSPREAD --   reject *** reject *** 
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK 
      CCCSPREAD ... reject *** reject *** reject *** 
Ho:  UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. AAASPREAD -- 
 
reject *** reject *** 
.. BBBSPREAD -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
.. CCCSPREAD --   reject *** reject *** 
No. of Obs. 1858    1355     503   
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Panel C: Monetary Shocks and Daily SWAP Rate 
 
Overall   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause EXPSHOCK 
      DSWP1 … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
DSWP2 … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
DSWP3 … -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
DSWP4 … -- 
 
reject ** reject ** 
DSWP5 … -- 
 
reject ** -- 
 DSWP7 … -- 
 
reject ** -- 
 DSWP10 … -- 
 
reject ** -- 
 DSWP30 … reject ** --   --   
Ho:  EXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      … DSWP1 -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
… DSWP2 -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
… DSWP3 -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
… DSWP4 reject ** -- 
 
-- 
 … DSWP7 reject ** -- 
 
-- 
 … DSWP10 reject ** --   --   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK 
      DSWP1 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP2 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP3 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP4 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP5 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP7 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP10 .. reject *** reject *** -- 
 DSWP30 .. reject *** reject *** --   
Ho:  UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. DSWP1  reject ** -- 
 
reject *** 
.. DSWP2  reject *** -- 
 
reject *** 
.. DSWP3 reject *** reject ** reject *** 
.. DSWP4 reject *** reject ** reject *** 
.. DSWP5 reject *** reject ** reject *** 
.. DSWP7 reject *** reject ** reject ** 
.. DSWP10 reject ** reject ** -- 
 .. DSWP30 --   --   reject ** 
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Panel D: Monetary Shocks and Daily Commercial Paper Rate  
 
Overall   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause EXPSHOCK 
      DCPF2M … reject *** reject *** -- 
 Other Financial Commercial Papers -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 DCPN2M … reject ** -- 
 
-- 
 DCPN3M … reject *** reject ** -- 
 DCPN30 … reject *** reject *** reject *** 
Other Non-Financial Commercial Papers --   --   --   
Ho:  EXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      … DCPF1M reject *** reject *** reject *** 
… DCPF2M reject *** reject *** -- 
 … DCPF3M -- 
 
reject *** reject *** 
.. Other Financial Commercial Papers  -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 … DCPN2M reject *** reject *** reject *** 
… DCPN3M reject ** reject ** -- 
 … DCPN30 reject *** reject ** reject *** 
.. Other Non-Financial Commercial Papers --   --   --   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause UNEXPSHOCK 
      DCPF1M .. reject *** reject ** -- 
 Other Financial CP … -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 DCPN30 .. reject ** -- 
 
-- 
 Other Non-Financial CP … --   --   --   
Ho:  UNEXPSHOCK does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. DCPF1M reject ** reject ** reject *** 
.. DCPF2M reject *** reject *** reject ** 
.. DCPF3M reject *** reject *** reject *** 
.. Other Financial Commercial Papers  -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 .. DCPN2M reject *** reject *** reject *** 
.. DCPN3M -- 
 
-- 
 
reject *** 
.. DCPN30 reject *** reject *** reject *** 
.. Other Non-Financial Commercial Papers --   --   --   
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Table III 
Monetary Policy Tools with Market Indices and Bond Spreads 
 
Panel A of Table III reports Granger Causality between unconventional monetary policy tools: log(TOTSPEC) as 
natural logarithm of total holding (in billion dollars) in special asset purchase programs by Federal Reserve 
System; and four Major market indices: Four Market Indices are: i) DJIA as return on Dow Jones Industrial 
Average Index, ii) EXM as change in major trade-weighted exchange index, iii) SNP500 as return on S&P500 
Index and iv) VIX as Implied Volatility Index on S&P500. Panel B reports Granger Causality between Monetary 
Shocks and Three bond spreads: i) AAA as AAA option-adjusted spread, ii) BBB as BBB option-adjusted spread, 
and iii) CCC as CCC option-adjusted spread. Panel B: Market Indices, Bond spreads and conventional monetary 
tools: i) DFF as Federal Fund Rate (in %) , and Federal Reserve System’s liability side tools such as: ii) log(M1) in 
natural logarithm of Narrow Money (in billion dollars), iii) log(NONM1) as natural logarithm of components of 
M2 not included in M1 (in billion dollars). 
 
*,** and *** correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All data are daily frequency. All 
index returns and bond spreads are in percentage. 
 
Panel A: Market Indices, Bond spreads and conventional Monetary tools 
 
All   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause  DFF 
       AAASPREAD … reject *** reject *** -- 
  BBBSPREAD … reject *** reject *** reject ** 
 CCCSPREAD … reject *** reject *** -- 
  DJIARET … reject *** reject *** -- 
  EXMRET … reject *** reject *** -- 
  SP5RET … reject *** reject *** -- 
  VIXRET … reject ** reject ** --   
Ho:   DFF does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. AAASPREAD -- 
 
reject *** -- 
 .. VIXRET -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
.. Other Market Indexes and Bond Spreads --   --   --   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause  log(M1) 
       AAASPREAD … -- 
 
reject *** -- 
  BBBSPREAD … reject *** reject *** -- 
  CCCSPREAD … reject *** reject *** -- 
  DJIARET … -- 
 
reject ** -- 
  EXMRET … -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
  SP5RET … -- 
 
reject ** -- 
  VIXRET … --   --   --   
Ho:  log( M1) does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. VIXRET -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
.. Other Market Indexes and Bond Spreads --   --   --   
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Panel A: Market Indices, Bond spreads and conventional Monetary tools 
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause  log(NONM1) 
       AAASPREAD … 
  
reject ** -- 
  BBBSPREAD … 
  
reject ** -- 
  CCCSPREAD … reject *** -- 
 
reject ** 
Other Market Indexes and Bond Spreads --   --   --   
Ho:   log(NONM1) does not Granger Cause .. 
      ..  BBBSPREAD -- 
   
-- 
 ..  CCCSPREAD -- 
 
reject ** -- 
 .. VIXRET -- 
 
-- 
 
reject ** 
.. Other Market Indexes and Bond Spreads --   --   --   
 
Panel B: Market Indices, Bond Spreads and Unconventional Monetary tools 
 
All   Pre-QE   QE Regime   
Ho:  ..  does not Granger Cause  log(TOTSPEC) 
       AAASPREAD … reject *** reject *** -- 
  BBBSPREAD … reject *** reject *** reject ** 
 CCCSPREAD … 
    
-- 
  DJIARET … 
    
-- 
  EXMRET … 
    
-- 
  SP5RET … 
    
-- 
  VIXRET … --   
  
--   
 
Ho:   log(TOTSPEC) does not Granger Cause .. 
      .. AAASPREAD 
    
reject *** 
..  BBBSPREAD reject *** reject *** reject ** 
..  CCCSPREAD reject *** 
  
reject ** 
..  DJIARET reject *** reject *** 
  .. EXMRET  
      .. SP5RET reject *** reject *** 
  .. VIXRET 
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